More equal than others: the neural basis of unfairness and inequality perception in the Ultimatum Game by Civai, Claudia
1 
 
 
Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati  
Trieste 
 
 
More Equal than Others 
The neural basis of unfairness and inequality perception in  
the Ultimatum Game 
 
Candidate: 
Claudia Civai 
 
Supervisor: 
Raffaella Rumiati 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Cognitive Neuroscience 
Trieste, 2011 
 
SISSA - Via Bonomea 265 - 34136 TRIESTE - ITALY 
2 
 
Jury 
Stefano Cappa 
Dipartimento di Neuroscienze,  
Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano, Italy. 
 
Mathew Diamond 
Cognitive Neuroscience Sector,  
International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA/ISAS), Trieste, Italy. 
 
Raffaella Rumiati 
Cognitive Neuroscience Sector,  
International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA/ISAS), Trieste, Italy. 
 
Alan Sanfey 
Donders Center for Cognitive Neuroscience,  
Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
 
Giorgia Silani 
Cognitive Neuroscience Sector,  
International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA/ISAS), Trieste, Italy. 
 
Giosue’ Baggio (substitute) 
Cognitive Neuroscience Sector,  
International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA/ISAS), Trieste, Italy. 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank Raffaella Rumiati, my supervisor, and Corrado 
Corradi Dell’Aqua, aka CCD, whom I have collaborated with, and informally co-supervised 
most of the present work. I thank Raffaella for having always believed in me and in my ideas, 
giving me both the chance and the means I needed to develop them. I thank CCD for being such 
a knowledgeable and patient teacher, as well as a good friend, and for always being there for me 
despite all our little arguments! Thank you, this work is ours. I would also like to thank Aldo 
Rustichini, Cristiano Crescentini and Mathias Gamer for having accepted to give their precious 
contributions to my work. 
 
I could not have made it without all my wonderful lab/dept. mates and friends, who made 
my time here unforgettable, broadening the horizons of my knowledge and making me feel part 
of something great, which SISSA is. Special thanks to Valentina Daelli, Eleonora Russo, 
Federico Stella, Olga Puccioni, and Paola Mengotti. Last but not least, thanks to Andrea 
Sciarrone and Alessio Isaja, the backbones of the Sector: none of us would be here without them!  
 
I am very grateful to SISSA for having given me the opportunity to move to Trieste and 
to meet those who turned out to be some of the most important people in my life, like Liuba 
Papeo, Antonella Masetto, Adriano Rosso, Michelangelo Mongiello, and Sara Bellinato. Thank 
you guys for making my life better every day.  
 
I thank my –extended- family (Ali, Vero, Fabri, Clelia, Alberto, Maddalena, Anedi, 
Nonna, Teo, Micky, Massi, Pelo, Ska, and Eli) and, especially, my mum and my dad, for having 
been supporting me, in any possible way, since ever, and never getting bored of doing that. You 
are incredible. 
 
Finally, I thank Carlo, because he has chosen to take the plunge and share his future with 
mine, teaching me what trust is. Love. 
4 
 
Contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................6 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................9 
1.1 Different approaches to study decisions  ..............................................................................10 
1.1.1 Game Theory .................................................................................................................10 
1.1.2 Behavioral Economics: social preferences and bounded rationality ...........................13 
1.1.3 The contribution of Cognitive and Brain Science and the rise of Neuroeconomics  ....14 
1.2 The Ultimatum Game  ..........................................................................................................17 
1.2.1 Theories of social preferences  ......................................................................................18 
1.2.2 Psychophysiological studies: skin conductance response (SCR) ..................................19 
1.2.3 Brain imaging studies: functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) ....................................20 
1.2.4 Neuropsychological studies: prefrontal patients ..........................................................22 
1.2.5 Brain stimulation studies: transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS), tryptophan depletion  ......................................................23 
1.2.6 What is there in a rejection? Open questions and hypothesis  ......................................24 
 
Chapter 2: Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven? Dissociated 
behavioral and emotional responses...........................................................................................25 
2.1 Introduction  .........................................................................................................................25 
2.2 Methods ................................................................................................................................27 
2.2.1 Participants  ....................................................................................................................27 
2.2.2 Task .................................................................................................................................27 
2.2.2 Apparatus and Procedure ...............................................................................................30 
2.2.3 Skin Conductance Recordings ........................................................................................30 
2.2.4 Emotional Ratings ...........................................................................................................31 
2.3 Results ..................................................................................................................................31 
2.3.1 Rejection Rate  ................................................................................................................32 
2.3.2 Emotional Ratings  ..........................................................................................................33 
2.3.4 Skin Conductance Response amplitude  .........................................................................34 
2.4 Discussion  ...........................................................................................................................36 
5 
 
 
Chapter 3: Disentangling self- and fairness- related neural mechanisms: an fMRI study ...41 
3.1 Introduction  .........................................................................................................................41 
3.2 Methods ................................................................................................................................43 
3.2.1 Participants  ....................................................................................................................43 
3.2.2 Task and stimuli ..............................................................................................................43 
3.2.2 Experimental Set-Up  ......................................................................................................44 
3.3.4 Behavioral and imaging data processing  ......................................................................45 
3.3 Results ..................................................................................................................................48 
3.3.1 Behavioral results  ..........................................................................................................48 
3.3.2 Neural Activations ..........................................................................................................49 
3.4 Discussion  ...........................................................................................................................57 
3.4.1 Self-Specific Neural Networks ........................................................................................57 
3.4.2 Fairness-Related Neural Networks .................................................................................61 
 
Chapter 4: Driving principles in decision-making: the role of abstract social rules  ............66 
4.1 Introduction  .........................................................................................................................66 
4.1.1 Experimental method  .....................................................................................................70 
4.2 Experiment 1: third party UG with an external proposer .....................................................71 
4.2.1 Method ............................................................................................................................72 
4.2.2 Results and discussion  ...................................................................................................73 
4.3 Experiment 2: the UG with allocators' manipulation ...........................................................75 
4.3.1 Method ............................................................................................................................77 
4.3.2 Results and discussion  ...................................................................................................78 
4.4 Experiment 3: third-party UG with coin's allocations ..........................................................79 
4.4.1 Method ............................................................................................................................80 
4.4.2 Results and discussion  ...................................................................................................82 
4.5 General discussion ................................................................................................................84 
4.5.1 Negative reciprocity ........................................................................................................85 
4.5.2 Inequality aversion .........................................................................................................87 
4.5.3 Self-involvement  .............................................................................................................89 
6 
 
 
Chapter 5: The neural basis of inequality as an abstract social rule  .....................................92 
5.1 Introduction  .........................................................................................................................92 
5.2 Methods ................................................................................................................................94 
5.2.1 Participants  ....................................................................................................................94 
5.2.2 Task and stimuli ..............................................................................................................94 
5.2.3 fMRI data acquisition and experimental set-up  .............................................................97 
5.3.4 Behavioral and imaging data processing  ......................................................................98 
5.3 Results ..................................................................................................................................99 
5.3.1 Behavioral results  ........................................................................................................100 
5.3.2 Neural Activations ........................................................................................................100 
5.4 Discussion  .........................................................................................................................107 
5.4.1 Self-Specific Neural Networks ......................................................................................108 
5.4.2 Fairness-Related Neural Networks ............................................................................... 110 
 
Chapter 6: General discussion  ................................................................................................. 112 
6.1 Emotional involvement and self-concerns  ........................................................................114 
6.2 Negative reciprocity, inequality aversion and self-involvement as salient contextual cue 115 
6.3 Inequality aversion as a default mode: moral norm or social heuristic? ............................ 118 
6.4 The role of the anterior insula  ...........................................................................................120 
6.5 Concluding remarks  ..........................................................................................................121 
 
References  ..................................................................................................................................123 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Abstract 
 
As the research on the Ultimatum Game (UG) has clearly demonstrated, the model of 
homo economicus fails to predict human behavior in a number of situations.. Many 
interpretations have been put forward in order to explain why players do not simply aim at 
maximizing their monetary payoff. For instance, models of social preferences (see e.g., Camerer, 
2003) try to provide a formal explanation for the apparently irrational behavior of people facing 
a certain kind of interactive situation. In chapter 1, a more detailed description of these accounts 
will be given, focusing especially on the specific case of the UG in relation to negative 
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) and inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).  From a psychological 
viewpoint, negative emotions, such as anger and frustration, elicited by the unfair treatment, are 
accounted to cause rejections (Pillutla and Murnigham, 1996).  
Neuroscientific findings support the idea that emotional reactions to unfairness cause the 
deviation from the rational expectation (van't Wout et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003); however, in 
its traditional formulation, the UG is a self-centered task: the offers address only the responder, 
and so does the potential unfairness. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether the frustration is 
elicited by the pure perception of unfairness or by the fact that the unfairness is affecting directly 
the responder, damaging his/her own payoff. In chapters 2-3, I will describe the modified 
version of the UG I have developed: asking participants to play as responders in both a classical 
UG (UG_MS –myself- condition) and a third party UG (UG_TP), where they had to decide to 
accepting or rejecting offers on behalf of the next responder, allows disentangling between the 
two possible options, i.e. frustration elicited by the perception of pure unfairness, or frustration 
elicited by the self-directed nature of the unfairness. Skin conductance response (SCR) (chapter 
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2) and BOLD signal (chapter 3) are used as indexes of emotional arousal and neural activation, 
respectively. In both studies, participants’ behavior shows no difference in UG_MS and in 
UG_TP (specifically, rejection rate is higher for unfair offers, and decreases as the offers become 
fairer both in UG_MS and in UG_TP); however, behavior dissociates both from the 
psychophysiological and the neural evidence. In particular, participants are more aroused (higher 
SCR and subjective emotional ratings) when rejecting compared to accepting offers in UG_MS, 
but not in UG_TP, where, instead, there is no effect of response; the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), an area which has been associated to emotions and self-perception, shows an increase 
of activation when rejecting, as opposed to accepting, offers in UG_MS, but not in the UG_TP, 
whereas a higher activation in anterior insula (AI) is associated with rejections for both MS and 
TP. The results from these two studies suggest that, albeit emotions clearly enter the decision-
making process, such as in MS, they should not be held as being the only mechanism that 
triggers rejections.  
In the traditional version of the UG, it is unclear whether the aversion towards low offers 
in the UG has to be accounted to the very unfair nature of these offers, or to the fact that 
responders simply do not like to get less than proposers. In chapter 4 I will present three 
behavioral studies in which I have manipulated both the allocator of the offers and their 
advantageousness: responders had to decide on offers made by either an external allocator or 
even a random number generator, which could be fair, unfair disadvantageous or unfair 
advantageous. Moreover, they were also asked to play on behalf of a third party, as in the 
previous two studies. Results showed that people tend to reject low offers, even if this does not 
mean to punish the source of unfairness; moreover, when playing for themselves, they are much 
more tolerant towards self-advantageous unfairness (or inequality), whereas, when playing on 
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behalf of a third party, they generally reject inequality. In chapter 5 I report the imaging results 
obtained administering the modified UG described above to the participants. Results show a 
major activation in the MPFC for unfair offers in MS but not in TP, especially for 
disadvantageous offers; IFG/AI’s activation was higher when facing unfair offers, both 
disadvantageous and advantageous, irrespectively of the target.  
To conclude, rejections in the UG do not always correlate with factors that have been 
described as the cause of rejections (inequality/unfairness, negative reciprocity, and negative 
emotions). Models that take into account that preferences may vary with contextual cues, e.g. 
self-involvement, as described here, merit, personality traits, etc., are the best candidates to 
explain socio-economic behavior. As far as the neural correlates are concerned, I propose that 
IFG/AI signals the deviation from an expected or a desired outcome. To understand whether 
equality can be considered either an expected or a desired outcome, further work is needed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Decisions are always complex. 
Humans make hundreds of decisions in everyday life, adjusting their behaviour depending on 
the feedbacks they receive by the surrounding environment: ranging from whether having 
another coffee to whether having kids, all choices we make require a constant integration of 
many different factors. For this reason, the features characterizing a decision vary along with the 
particular situation in which a person is acting. For instance, imagine to be driving alone, on a 
deserted road, when you eventually reach a junction: the map is not very clear, but, as far as you 
can guess, either road could take you to your destination; however, while you are familiar with 
the road on your left, you have never taken the road on your right, which, from the map, seems to 
be the shortest. What are you going to do? Your decision depends on many factors: are you in a 
hurry? Are you a risk-taking person who likes novelties? Is the map reliable? This situation well 
exemplifies a condition in which the decision is made under uncertainty, given that not all the 
alternative outputs are known to you; moreover, any decision you take is going to influence only 
11 
 
yourself, as far as that particular situation is concerned (individual decision-making). Here is 
another example: you are driving the same old car, but this time you are together with a friend, 
when you find yourself to a junction. You are familiar with both the road on the right and the 
road on the left: the first one is faster, but with a lot of turns, and you know that your friend 
suffers from car sickness, and thus prefers the road on the left. However, you are a bit in a hurry, 
so what are you going to do? Again, your decision will depend on different factors, such as how 
much in a hurry you are and how much you care for your friend; this time you know precisely 
each of the outcomes and, also, the decision will influence others too, characterizing your 
decision-making as social. Despite the dichotomies between individual and social decision-
making or between decision-making under certainty or uncertainty, all kinds of decisions share 
the complexity of integrating different environmental, cognitive and emotional factors. This 
complexity has led scholars to approach this issue from various perspectives and at different 
levels of analysis.  
In the following paragraphs, I will briefly review the main perspectives within which 
decision-making has been addressed, focusing specifically on social decision-making, the main 
topic of this dissertation. 
 
1.1 Different approaches to study decisions 
1.1.1 Game Theory  
Game Theory (GT) is a toolkit of mathematical models for analyzing the way in which 
decision-makers interact with and influence one another; it also offers a large amount of 
interactive situations that can be used as behavioral tasks to test its predictions. However, the 
viewpoint of classical GT is rational rather than psychological or sociological, as stated by the 
12 
 
Nobel Laureate Robert Aumann when defining the concept in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics; for this reason, the theory is grounded on assumptions, some of which may not 
exactly be satisfied in a typical real-world situation.  
The first important assumption is that, in order to rank the set of outcomes to choose 
from, an individual can assign a value to each of the possible outcomes, which reflects her own 
preferences; these preferences are stable and consistent within each individual. Moreover, Game 
Theory assumes that players are rational, meaning that their objective is to maximize their own 
payoff, whose value is measured on a utility scale, that gives an index of the player preferences 
(see Utility Theory as described by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Game Theory also 
assumes that players are intelligent, which means that they know everything about the game and 
can infer everything as the game theorist does; this leads to consider players strategic, expecting 
them to choose the strategy resulted from the maximization of the expected utility.   
As aforementioned, Game Theory describes a large amount of  strategic situations, i.e. 
games, which according to Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995) can be described by four 
elements: players, who make decisions, rules, specifying what players can do and what they 
know, outcomes and preferences. These are the matching pennies, the prisoners’ dilemma, the 
battle of sexes, just to mention a few of them (see e.g., Watson, 2008, for an extensive review). In 
the prisoners’ dilemma, for instance, there are two players A and B (prisoners), who 
simultaneously choose to cooperate or to defect; the outcomes are all the possible combinations 
of defection and cooperation, i.e. {(C,C), (D,C), (C,D), (D,D)}, as expressed in the following 
payoff matrix. 
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Figure 1.1: Payoff matrix for the prisoners’ dilemma.  
 
The preferences on the utility scale are then DC>CC>DD>CD. 
The solution concept of the game is a mathematical rule for generating predictions; the 
most important and well-known solution concept in Game Theory is the Nash equilibrium1 
(Nash, 1950), which represents a combination of strategies, one for each players, with the 
property that each player’s strategy is optimal given each other player’s choice. In the case of the 
prisoners’ dilemma, Nash equilibrium is that both players choose to defect, the outcome (D,D): 
in fact, if both players cooperate they maximize both their payoffs, but neither player has an 
incentive to begin cooperating, given that unilateral cooperation would shift the player from the 
third worst payoff to the very worst one. 
                                              
1 Nash Equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has incentive to 
unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that 
player to earn less than if she remained with her current strategy. For games in which players randomize (mixed 
strategies), the expected or average payoff must be at least as large as that obtainable by any other strategy. 
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As I previously mentioned, Game Theory offers a bunch of descriptions of strategic and 
interactive situations, which can be used to test experimentally its predictions. However, 
empirical studies showed that standard economic analysis, which attributes to the decision maker 
both the will to maximize her own income and unbounded reasoning capabilities, failed to 
predict human behavior in many situations.  
 
1.1.2 Behavioral Economics: social preferences and bounded rationality. 
As defined by Gul Faruk in the The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, behavioral 
economics refers to the research program that investigates the relationship between psychology 
and economic behavior; in fact, it has been seen that taking into account psychological variables, 
such as vengeance motives or fairness concerns, and human’s limited cognitive capacity, is 
crucial in order to predict correctly human behavior. Many theories have been developed to 
incorporate these variables in formal socio-economical models; in particular, theories of social 
preferences try to provide a formal explanation for the apparently irrational behavior of people 
facing a certain kind of interactive situation. A more detailed description of these theories is 
given ahead in this chapter, when the specific case of the Ultimatum Game is taken into 
consideration. 
Whereas theories of social preferences address the issue of the apparent lack of 
rationality by investigating humans’ preferences for principles other than the maximization of 
monetary outcome, models of bounded rationality focus on people’s cognitive constraints that 
limit the amount of available information. In 1957, in his Models of Man, Herbert Simon 
introduced the term bounded rationality in opposition to full rationality, maximization of 
expected utility, or simply optimization. The question he asked himself was: “how do human 
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beings reason when the conditions for rationality postulated by the model of neoclassical 
economics theory are not met?” Simon suggests that economic agents employ the use of 
heuristics to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization, in order to face 
together the complexity of the situation, and their inability to process and compute the expected 
utility of every alternative action. The 2002 Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahnemnan distinguishes 
“two modes of thinking and deciding, which correspond roughly to the everyday concepts of 
reasoning and intuition” (Kahneman’s Prize Lecture, December 8th, 2002); he claims that 
reasoning is at work when we deliberately –and effortfully- compute something, such as a 
mathematical problem or the road on a map, while intuition is what makes us “reluctant to eat a 
piece of what we know to be chocolate that has been formed in the shape of a cockroach” 
(Kahneman’s Prize Lecture), and since it comes spontaneously to mind, without computation, it 
is also the most exploited system of the two. A different approach to bounded rationality is the 
one put forward by Gerd Gigerenzer and collaborators (Gigerenzer et al.,1999), who 
demonstrated that individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics which are better 
off than formal logic to solve problems of everyday life, given that ignoring aspects of the 
information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all different types of 
information, like for instance for low predictability events and small samples. 
 
1.1.3 The contribution of Cognitive and Brain Science and the rise of Neuroeconomics. 
The same issues about how people make decisions have been addressed also by 
psychology and cognitive sciences, that describe these phenomena using a less formal approach, 
as it is typical of these disciplines, and introducing other concepts such as personality traits, 
emotions and moral sentiments. Cognitive sciences aim at investigating the influence of 
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psychological factors on the behavior, such as the correlation between anger and frustration with 
decisions in bargaining games (see the wounded pride/ spite model by Pillutla and Murnighan 
(1996), discussed more in details in the next paragraph). However, social and psychological 
sciences can, at most, infer the cognitive and emotional underpins, whereas the neuroscientific 
methods that have been recently developed can allow the identification of the micro-foundations 
of the cognitive activity in the neural system. 
For instance, the feedback from the environment is crucial in order to successfully adjust 
our decisions; such adjustment depends on the ability to discriminate between negative and 
positive feedbacks, which indicate the appropriateness of behaviour (Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, 
Mol, and Coles, 2004). This important aspect of decision-making has been extensively studied in 
recent years. The method that better mirrors feedback processing is the detection of the event-
related potentials (ERPs), which have been largely employed in these studies. Another example 
is the involvement of emotions in decision-making, an issue that has been recently given a lot of 
attention: thanks to psychophysiological methods, such as skin conductance response (SCR) and 
neuroimaging, especially functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), it has been possible to 
investigate this issue in much more details, obtaining quantitative data to correlate to the 
subjective self-report psychological scales. In discussing the role played by emotions in decision 
processes, it is essential to describe a very influential view, which is called the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The somatic marker hypothesis posits that emotion-
related bodily signals assist cognitive decision-making, supporting the idea that knowledge and 
reasoning alone are usually not sufficient to make advantageous decision. This concept is in 
contrast with the traditional point of view whereby emotion is considered to perturb rational 
decisions. In contrast, in Bechara and Damasio’s model, emotions can be either beneficial or 
17 
 
disruptive depending on whether they are integrated into the task or unrelated to it, respectively. 
Emotion is defined as a collection of changes in body and brain states triggered by brain 
structures such as amygdala, insula, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and the brainstem. Several 
empirical evidences support the somatic marker hypothesis, and most of the studies employed 
the Iowa Gambling Task, the skin conductance response and brain damaged patients (Bechara A., 
Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 2005; Damasio A., 2005; Bechara A., Damasio, Tranel, and 
Damasio, 1997; Bechara A., Damasio, Damasio, and Lee, 1999). Even though many criticisms 
have been moved to this theory (see, for example, Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, and Caramazza, 2002), 
it is undoubted that the contribution of emotions to decision making processes is a relevant issue 
to explore. 
The emerging neuroeconomic approach seeks a microfoundation of social and economic 
activity in neural circuitry, using different methods such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), pharmacological interventions and 
other techniques. The neuroeconomic approach aims at unifying mechanistic, mathematical and 
behavioral measures and constructs, in order to better understand: 
“individual differences and development over the human lifecycle (including disorders 
and expertise), insights into the effects of direct and social learning, empirical discipline of 
evolutionary modeling, and advice for how economic rules and institutions can be designed so 
that people react to rules in a socially efficient way.” (Fehr & Camerer, C., 2007). 
Given that the work described in the next chapters is focused on one single game, 
specifically the Ultimatum Game, I will now discuss this issue more in details; in order to clarify 
the theoretical frame shaped on this specific, I will briefly review the previous findings in 
literature, and focus on the open questions that have provided the starting point of my research. 
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1.2 The Ultimatum Game 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is one of the classical paradigms used to investigate 
economic decision-making, and is taken as paradigmatic evidence to illustrate the failure of 
classical economic theories in predicting human behavior. In its traditional version, developed by 
Güth and colleagues about thirty years ago (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982), one 
player (the proposer) makes offers to a second player (the responder) on how to split an amount 
of money given by the experimenter; the responder, in turn, can either accept or reject the offer. 
If the responder accepts, the money will be divided as suggested by the proposer; if the 
responder declines the offer, both players end up with nothing.  
Classical economic theories (e.g., Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) posit that the 
proposer, in order to maximize the gain, should always offer the smallest amount of money, 
whilst the responder, following the principle that “few is better than nothing”, should always 
accept the offer; this constitutes the Nash equilibrium for this game. In contrast with this 
prediction, behavioral findings clearly show that the proposer tends to divide the money equally, 
and that the responder rejects unfair offers which favor the proposer too much. Importantly, this 
behavioral pattern has also been observed in both the “single-shot” version of the UG, in which 
the two players interact once only, and in the “covered” version of the UG, in which the proposer 
is not informed about the responder’s reaction (Abbink, Sadrieh, and Zamir 1999; Zamir, 2001; 
Civai, Corradi Dell'Acqua, Gamer, and Rumiati 2010), making rejections losing their negotiating 
role. 
 
1.2.1 Theories of social preferences. 
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Why do people behave against their self-interest? Two theoretical approaches have been 
developed in order to explain the apparently irrational behavior in the UG. The first one claims 
that rejections are grounded in the strategic thinking: proposers offer more than what is predicted 
by game equilibrium because they know that otherwise their offers will be rejected, increasing 
strategically their chances to maximizing their expected payoffs (Weg and Zwick, 1994). The 
second approach takes into account the so-called social preferences: this account posits that 
people, being endowed with some sense of fairness, may not only care about their self-interest, 
but also about the interest of others (e.g., Guth, 1988). To disentangle between these two 
approaches, a crucial variant of the UG, called the Dictator Game (DG), was introduced by 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986): in this game, the proposer becomes a dictator, since the 
offer cannot be rejected by the responder, who, therefore, becomes a simple receiver. Results 
show that a considerable percentage of people are driven by a taste for fairness, offering more 
than the minimum offer predicted by classical utility theories, although offers are lower than in 
the UG, and there are exceptions that will be discussed in the following sections. These 
evidences suggest that, even though, to a certain extent, strategic thinking affects offers (offers in 
DG are lower than in UG), fairness concerns may play an important role. Within the social 
preferences theoretical framework, several models have been developed in the last years (for an 
overview see Camerer, 2003). Theories of inequity aversion (Bolton, 1991; Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) claim that an agent's utility is completely determined by the 
final distribution of outcomes, and that people are motivated by a general distaste for unequal 
outcome: player B will always reject an unfair distribution, even though it is decided by the 
fortune.  By contrast, theories of reciprocal fairness or negative reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) assume that “people like to 
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help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them” (Rabin, 1993). These 
models take into account the influence of the actual actions and beliefs on agent's utility in 
determining the decision: if player A reduces the payoff of player B in order to obtain benefits, 
player B will negatively reciprocate player A by punishing his/her bad intentions, whereas if 
incomes’ distribution is decided by the fortune, player B will not punish player A for getting a 
higher payoff (Blount, 1995; Charness, 1996; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). In this perspective, 
rejections in the UG can be interpreted as a tool in the hand of the responder to punish a proposer 
who behaved unfairly.  
In order to study these issues, I have run a series of three experiments, described in 
chapter 4, which aimed at shedding light on the role played both by inequity aversion and by 
negative reciprocity on UG’s rejections. 
 
In a psychological perspective, negative emotions, such as frustration, have been elected 
as the ultimate cause of rejections: Pillutla and Murninghan (1996) described the wounded 
pride/spite model, which claim that perception of unfairness can lead to anger and wounded 
pride and, ultimately, to a spiteful rejection. Some of the main neuroscientific findings that, 
thanks to the innovative approach, helped to shed light on the psychological basis of the UG 
behavior will be reviewed below. 
 
1.2.2 Psychophysiological studies: skin conductance response (SCR) 
When looking at the effective presence of emotional arousal, a straight and relatively 
simple way to detect it is to measure the electrodermal activation. This represents the level of 
activation of the sympathetic system, detected by placing two active electrodes on two fingers of 
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one hand and applying a small amount of current; the conductance (or the resistance) of the skin 
is represented by the quantity of sweat present in the sweating ducts: the more the amount of the 
sweat, the higher is the conductance (or, conversely, the smaller is the resistance). The receptors 
present in the hands' palms refer are known to be specifically sensitive to cognitive and 
emotional efforts more that to the temperature regulation; for this reason, this index is 
particularly suitable to detect the effects of the cognitive and especially emotional arousal 
(Boucscein, 1992). One disadvantage of this technique is that is a-specific: it cannot disentangle 
among the different types of arousals, and, therefore, among the different kinds of emotions. To 
overcome this problem, it is necessary to ask for self-reported impressions to the participants –
for example, by administering emotional rating scales-, in order to match the physiological index 
with the effective cognitive-emotional state. 
The emotional model put forward by Pillutla and Mourninghan has been supported by a 
study carried out by van't Wout and colleagues (van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey and Aleman, 2006): 
the authors found that participants playing as responders in a classical UG showed a higher SCR 
when rejecting, as opposed to accepting, unfair offers made by a human being, whereas in the 
control condition, in which they were playing against a computer, they did not show this 
difference between responses. They concluded that, negative emotions trigger rejections. 
However, the next chapter will discuss a recently published study, in which we have shown that 
rejection of unfairness is not necessarily correlated to emotional reactions. 
 
1.2.3 Brain imaging studies: functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) 
The use of imaging techniques has spread widely in recent years, and the majority of the 
research centers nowadays have the availability to a scanner for magnetic resonance 
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measurement. In particular, the more popular is the functional magnetic resonance, which offers 
the possibility to get a functional image of the brain while the participant is administered with a 
task. The cerebral activity is measured as the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal, 
which represents the level of metabolism in a specific area of the brain: the assumption 
underneath is that the more an area is active, the more is the oxygen required to that area, and the 
stronger the signal. This technique has some limitations, such as the poor temporal resolution, as 
compared to other techniques such as the electro-encephalography, and the fact that the signal 
actually represents an indirect measure of the cerebral activity; however, it is non-invasive, safe 
and relatively available, thus the most popular imaging technique.  
Sanfey et al. carried out an fMRI study to investigate which brain areas were activated in 
participants playing as responders, finding that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate 
cortex and anterior insula were more active when processing unfair as opposed to fair offers. In 
particular, the anterior insula, an area traditionally associated to negative emotions such as 
disgust (e.g. Calder, Lawrence and Young, 2001), was more active during rejections as opposed 
to acceptances; the authors interpreted the results as a proof of an involvement of negative 
emotions in triggering rejections (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom and Cohen, 2003). While 
Sanfey and colleagues focused on areas involved in unfairness and rejections, Tabibnia and 
colleagues paid their attention to the areas associated with the perception of fairness: they found 
that commonly identified reward areas, such as ventral striatum, amygdala and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, were associated with the preference for fair outcome (Tabibnia, Satpute, and 
Lieberman, 2008). Another interesting result concerning the reward system, which is the brain 
circuit activated by a reward administered to the subject, comes from the positron emission 
tomography (PET) study of de Quervain et al. (de Quervain, et al., 2004): the results showed an 
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activation in the dorsal striatum, part of the reward system, when subjects where actively 
punishing unfair individuals, supporting the idea that punishing violators of social and moral 
norms is satisfactory.  
In chapters 3 and 5 I will report two fMRI studies in which the link among unfairness, 
rejections and crucial brain areas such as anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex is further 
clarified. 
 
1.2.4 Neuropsychological studies: prefrontal patients 
The study of brain damaged patients is one of the oldest methods to investigate the 
connections between brain and behavior. As already mentioned when talking about the Somatic-
marker hypothesis, patients with a lesion of the ventromedial part of the prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) show deficits, especially as far as decision-making is concerned. 
Koenigs and Tranel (2007) investigated the responder behavior of ventromedial prefrontal 
patients and showed that these patients were more prone to frustration, since they were rejecting 
more unfair offers compared to controls, suggesting that this area is involved in the emotional 
control. 
Partially in contrast with these results, Moretti, Dragone, and di Pellegrino (2009) found 
that vmPFC patients actually rejected more unfair offers, as opposed to controls, but only when 
the financial gains were presented as abstract amounts, whereas, when they were immediately 
delivered to the patients, their rejection rate showed no difference from controls; these results 
suggested than vmPFC is involved in processing the expected values of abstract and future goals 
more than the feeling of frustration associated to the actual social value of the offer. 
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1.2.5 Brain stimulation studies: transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS), tryptophan depletion. 
So far, I have described methods that show correlations between cerebral or physiological 
activity, but that, apart from patients’ studies, do not allow any inference about causality. I am 
now going to review some studies in which brain stimulation techniques were used, allowing 
some causal hypothesis between brain areas or physiological processes and behavior in the UG. 
Knoch and colleagues (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer and Fehr. 2006) applied the 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) of participants playing as responders. This technique consists in administering subjects 
with a magnetic impulse on a specific brain area, which causes a perturbation in the regular 
electrical neuronal activity, temporarily disrupting the functionality of that particular area; for 
this reason, it is also called “virtual lesion technique”. The results showed that the disruption of 
the activity in the dlPFC caused a decrease in the rejection rate of participants, despite the offers 
were still considered unfair: following the authors' interpretation, this suggests that this area 
plays a crucial role in fairness perception, being important to override self-interest in order to 
implement fairness goals. In a further study, Knoch et al. (Knoch, et al., 2008) replicated the 
results using another stimulation technique, the transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS): in 
this case, not a magnetic impulse, but a direct electric current interfere with the neuronal activity 
of the area underneath the electrodes. 
Another interesting and promising avenue of research is the pharmacological approach, 
which consists in interfering with the brain activity by modifying the metabolism of a particular 
neurotransmitter. In a recent work, Crockett and colleagues (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, 
Lieberman, and Robbins, 2008) showed how decreasing the amount of serotonin, by the 
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depletion of its precursor amminoacid (tryptophan) causes an increase in the UG rejection rate, 
supporting a correlation between the emotional effects of the lack serotonin and the reaction to 
unfairness. 
 
1.2.6 What is there in a rejection? Open questions and hypothesis.  
So far, all the evidences seem to converge towards a strong involvement of emotions in 
the rejections of unfairness: the correlation between unfairness and frustration which leads, 
consequently, to an irrational rejection seems to be straightforward. However the UG is, for its 
own definition, a self-centered task: the offers address only the responder, and so does the 
potential unfairness. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether the frustration is elicited by the 
pure perception of unfairness or by the fact that the unfairness is damaging the responder herself. 
The modified version of the UG I have developed in order to disentangle between these two 
possible causes is described in the next chapter, and it has been used to test both the emotional 
arousal (chapter 2) and the neural activation (chapter 3). 
Moreover, in the traditional version of the UG, responders face offers which are unfair 
but also disadvantageous for her, making unclear whether responders' aversion towards low 
offers in the UG has to be accounted to the very unfair nature of these offers, therefore 
supporting an endowed preference for fair outcomes, or to the fact that responders simply do not 
like to get less than proposers, focusing on a more selfish motive. Finally, while it is true that 
more than one study has proven that intentions of the counterpart matter when deciding whether 
to accept or reject an allocation, however they cannot account in toto for the deviation from 
classic rationality. I have addressed these issues by further manipulating the traditional UG, and 
chapters four and five report behavioral and imaging results. 
26 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly 
emotionally-driven? Dissociated behavioral and 
emotional responses. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years the study of the role of emotions in decision-making has become an 
increasingly prominent issue in cognitive neuroscience. A wealth of studies have hypothesized an 
emotional pathway in the brain that seems to operate in many types of decisional processes, 
including moral judgment (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005, for a 
review) and economic decision-making (Pillutla & Murninghan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003), that 
have traditionally been linked to rational thinking and choices (Kohlberg, 1969; von Neumann & 
Morgestern, 1944). 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) has always been thought of as a classical example of 
emotionally-driven behavior.  It has been argued that self-centered emotions, such as anger and 
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frustration, play a crucial role in the UG, as the individual payoff is heavily involved (Moll & de 
Oliveira-Souza, 2007). However, it has also been proved that individuals choose to punish 
unfairness even though the violation of fairness and cooperation norms does not affect directly 
their payoffs (i.e. the third-party punishment): Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found that 
participants decided to give up some of their own money to punish the unfair behavior of one 
player towards another. Thus, altruistic punishment, which is an act of punishment that, even if 
costly and yielding no direct benefit for the punisher (as in the case of single-shot UG), is used to 
penalize selfish behavior of others, as it leads them to cooperate in future interactions (Fehr & 
Gachter, 2002), also occurs in conditions in which unfairness should not elicit, at least in 
principle, any self-centered emotion. This raises the question of whether, in the UG task, the 
“irrational” punishing behavior and negative emotions are always causally related, or whether 
they can operate separately depending on the myself / third-party distinction. 
In the present study, I have investigated the role of emotions in the UG by measuring skin 
conductance responses (SCR) while participants played as responders in a modified version of 
the UG and by collecting emotional ratings after they completed the task in order to measure the 
valence of the hypothetical arousal. Participants carried out both the classical version of the UG 
and a modified version of the task in which any putative monetary income was not going into the 
participants’ own pocket, but into a third-party’s (see Method section). Indeed, as in the latter 
condition the proposer’s offer did not directly address the participant’s payoff, unfairness should, 
at least in principle, elicit neither self-centered emotions (Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007), nor, 
as consequence, SCR increases when the offer is about to be rejected (van’t Wout et al., 2006). 
Thus, the account according to which the punishing behavior and the negative emotions are 
causally related (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Pillutla & Murninghan, 1996), also predicts that such 
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emotional decrease should be associated with a similar decrease in the amount of punishing 
choices (rejections) (van’t Wout et al., 2006). However, based on previous studies on altruistic 
punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), I predicted that participants should reject unfair offers 
addressing a third-party; if this were indeed the case, a significant increase in SCR was expected, 
for offers about to be rejected even in the third-party condition. 
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-four healthy Italian volunteers (22 females), who ranged in age from 18 to 35 
years (M=23.56, SD=3.90), took part in the experiment. They all were paid for participating in 
the study, the scientific goal of which was unknown to them. The study was approved by the 
local ethics committee and conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
2.2.2 Task 
Participants were required to play as responders in a modified version of the UG and had 
either to accept or reject the offers the proposer made, following the classical rules explained 
above. Before starting the game, they were introduced to a collaborator of the experimenter, who 
pretended to play as the proposer, in order to strengthen the illusion of playing against a human 
adversary, whereas they were actually playing against a computer. They were told that the 
opponent had been given a number of 10 euros bank notes and would have to make offers on 
how to split each of them. Consistent with previous studies (Polezzi, et al., 2008), offers in each 
trial could be either 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 euros out of 10. Furthermore, participants were informed that, 
in one condition, they and their opponent would play for themselves (consistent with the 
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classical UG), whereas, in another condition, they would play on behalf of those players acting 
as proposer and responder in the upcoming testing session (see Figure 2.1). In order to make our 
task compatible to the single-shot UG, participants were told that the opponent would receive 
feedback only at the end of the experiment, when they have both been informed on how much 
each of them had gained, depending on the choices they had made; in this way, they knew 
rationally that they could not affect the opponent’s behavior through their rejections. 
To control for the social interactive nature of the UG, participants performed a control 
task (Free Win [FW] task) in which they either accepted or rejected a variable amount of money 
given by the computer (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 euros). As in the case of the UG, they could decide for 
themselves or on behalf of the next participant. If they accepted the offer, they/the third party 
would receive that amount; otherwise they/the third party would receive nothing. This yielded to 
a 2 x 2 x 5 design, with TASK (UG vs. FW), TARGET (myself -MS- vs. third-party -TP-) and 
GAIN (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 euros) as within-subjects factors. 
Participants were informed that their compensation for participating in the experiment 
would be proportional to the amount of money gained in the MS condition. Moreover, they knew 
that a percentage of the money split on behalf of third parties would be given to next players; 
they were also informed that, following the same principle, their starting stakes were percentages 
of the money that previous players had split on their behalf. Irrespective of their performance on 
the task, participants received the same amount of money as compensation. Although we did not 
systematically investigate whether participants had doubts about the authenticity of the situation, 
the majority of them, when informally interviewed afterwards, said they believed they had 
played against a human opponent. Only a few reported having doubts at the end of the 
experimental session.  
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of the task as it was presented to participants when giving the instructions. There 
are four conditions: the first and the second refer to the Ultimatum Game and the third and the fourth refer 
to the control task (Free Win situation). In the first and in the third conditions participants are asked to 
decide for themselves, whereas in the second and in the fourth they are asked to choose on behalf of a 
third party (next participant). 
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2.2.3 Apparatus and Procedure 
All the participants were tested in a quiet room at SISSA using a pc and a 15-in monitor 
(Olidata s.p.a.). Presentation® 12.0 software (http://www.neurobs.com) was used to construct 
and deliver the experimental stimuli. The offer appeared on the screen for five seconds, followed 
by a six-second blank screen. Participants were required to respond by button press, highlighted 
on the computer keyboard, as soon as the question “Do you accept?” appeared on the screen, 
where it lasted for two seconds (see Figure 2). The inter-trial interval was around 11 seconds on 
average, to allow skin conductance to return to its baseline. All 20 conditions, each of which was 
repeated four times, were presented in a randomized order. The whole experiment (80 trials * 24 
seconds of trial duration) including a short break of one minute after half of the trials lasted 
approximately 33 minutes. 
 
Figure 2.2. Time line for each single trial of the UG. Each trial lasted 24 seconds. First, participants saw 
the offer on the screen for five seconds, followed by six seconds of blank screen. Next, the question “do 
you accept/do you accept on his behalf” appeared on the screen for two seconds, within which 
participants had to answer by button press. An average of eleven seconds inter-trial interval followed the 
question.  
 
2.2.4 Skin Conductance Recordings 
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Skin conductance was recorded during the whole experiment using a pair of prewired 8 
mm Ag/AgCl electrodes, attached to the distal phalanx surfaces of the index and little finger of 
the non-dominant hand. The electrode pair was excited with a constant voltage of 0.5 V and 
conductance was recorded using a DC amplifier with a low-pass filter set at 64 Hz and a sample 
frequency of 256 Hz. Values of skin conductance were automatically transformed to 
microsiemens values by the Procomp Infinity System (Bio-Medical Instruments, Inc., Warren, 
MI, USA). Before starting the task, one minute of baseline was recorded. I measured the artifact-
free amplitude of the skin-conductance response that began between 1 and 3 seconds after the 
presentation of the offer and exceeded a threshold of 0.05 µS. In the case of overlapping 
responses, the inflection point between the two responses served as the baseline or peak, 
depending on the latency criterion. The resulting amplitudes were z-transformed within each 
participant in order to eliminate individual differences in responsivity. 
 
2.2.5 Emotional Ratings 
To further investigate the emotional reactions in this study, participants rated their 
feelings in the most crucial conditions (i.e., 1, 3 and 5 euros of gain when playing the UG in both 
the MS and the TP condition) at the end of the experimental session. To this aim, they used a 12-
points Likert-scale for each condition ranging from -6, corresponding to strong negative 
emotions, to +6, indicating strong positive emotions. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Rejection Rates 
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For each subject and condition, the rejection rates were calculated across all 4 repetitions, 
and used in a 2 (TASK: UG, FW) x 2 (TARGET: MS,TP) x 5 (GAIN: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Euros) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA. Statistical Analysis was carried out using SPSS 11.5 Software 
(SPSS Inc., Chertsey UK). Results indicated a significant main effect of TASK (F (1, 33) = 
76.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .69), with the UG eliciting a larger amount of rejections than the FW (see 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3), as well as a main effect of GAIN (F (4, 132) = 52.7, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.61), with low offers being rejected more than high offers. This effect is however driven by the 
TASK x GAIN interaction, which was found to be significant as well (F (4, 132) = 49.89, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .60), suggesting that low offers are rejected significantly more often than high offers 
in the UG but not in the FW. None of the remaining effects of the ANOVA were found to be 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 2.1 Rejection rates (RR) (percentages) and skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR amp) (z-
transformed µS) for the four conditions collapsed by gain. 
 
 UG FW 
Myself Third-party Myself 
RR (SEM) 35.73 (5.59) 38.09 (4.93) 2.64 (0.68) 
SCR amp (SEM) .0887 (.0157) -.0073 (.0164) .0257 (.0146) 
 
Note. Corresponding standard errors of the mean are printed in brackets. 
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Figure 2.3. Behavioral results. Rejection rates (in percent) plotted as a function of GAIN in the 
MA (A) and the TP (B) condition.  
 
2.3.2 Emotional Ratings 
The emotional ratings for the most unfair offer (1 euros out of 10), the fairest offer (5 
euros out of 10) and the mid-value offer (3 euros out of 10) were analyzed, both for MS and TP 
conditions. One-sample two-tailed T-tests showed that for the mid-value offer the ratings did not 
differ significantly from zero (i.e. the neutral emotion), while for both targets, the ratings for the 
unfair offer were significantly different from 0 towards the negative emotion (UG (1:9) MS: t 
(33) = -9.79, p<.001 UG (1:9) TP: t (33) = -4.37 , p<.005), and so were those for the fair offer 
towards the positive emotion (UG (5:5) MS: t (33) = 22.29, p<.001; UG (5:5) TP: t (33) = 5.63, 
p<.005. Moreover, an ANOVA, considering TARGET (MS and TP) and GAIN (1, 3, 5 euros out 
of 10) as factors, showed a significant effect of TARGET (F(1,33)=4.328, p<.05, ηp2 =.116), a 
significant effect of GAIN (F(2,66)=101.82, p<.001, ηp2 =.75), and a significant TARGET x 
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GAIN interaction (F(2,66)=12.662, p<.001, ηp2 =.277). A paired-samples T-test demonstrated that 
there was a significant difference between targets for fair (t(33)=4.01, p<.001) and unfair 
(t(33)=-2.742, p<.01) offers, while no difference between targets were found for the mid-value 
offer; in particular, both the reported positive and the negative emotions were rated as stronger in 
the MS than in the TP condition. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Emotional ratings. The black bars indicate the MS condition, while the grey bars indicate the 
TP condition, for gain 1, 3 and 5. Error bars indicate the standard deviation. 
 
2.3.3 Skin Conductance Response amplitude 
For each subject and condition, the average of z-standardized skin conductance response 
amplitudes were calculated across all 4 repetitions, and used in a 2 (TASK) x 2 (TARGET) x 5 
(GAIN) Repeated Measures ANOVA. A significant main effect of TASK (MSE = 0.23, F (1,33) 
= 4.91, p < .05, ηp2 = .13) and a significant main effect of TARGET (MSE = 0.28, F (1,33) = 
7.93, p < .01, ηp2 = .19) were found, suggesting that participants were more aroused whilst 
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playing the UG than the FW, and when their own interest, and not the third-party’s, was at stake 
(see Table 2.1). None of the remaining effects were found to be significant. 
In addition, I investigated the relation between SCR and rejections. Following van’t Wout 
et al. (2006), we focused our analysis on small offers (1 Euro), as in the UG they were associated 
with the largest negative emotional arousal (see our analysis of emotional ratings above).  A 
Linear Mixed Model (Neuhaus, McCulloch, & Shayle, 2008) was used, which is more robust 
against missing cells, as few subjects scored in all conditions. The model included RESPONSE 
(accept/reject), TARGET and TASK as fixed factors, and SUBJECTS as random factor. A 
compound symmetry covariance structure was specified. I found a significant main effect of 
TARGET (F(1, 138.67) = 7.36, p<.01), indicating a stronger emotional arousal when offers were 
directed to oneself (0.23 ± .11 z-transformed SCR) rather than to a TP  (-3.46·10-5 ± .09 z-
transformed SCR), and a significant TARGET x RESPONSE interaction (F(1, 144.91) = 4.28, 
p<.05), reflecting participants’ higher SCR amplitudes when rejecting small offers for themselves 
than when rejecting for a third-party. No target difference was found for the acceptances (see 
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.5). 
 
 
Table 2.2 Skin conductance response amplitudes (z-transformed) for Rejections and Acceptances both for 
the Myself and for the Third-party condition. 
 
 Myself Third-party 
Rejections .560 (.151) -.085 (.146) 
Acceptances .043 (.115) -.043 (.128) 
 
Note. Corresponding standard errors of the mean are printed in brackets. 
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Figure 2.5. Physiological results. Z-standardized skin conductance response amplitudes plotted as a 
function of RESPONSE for Gain 1. Full lines and filled circles refer to the MS condition, whereas dashed 
lines and empty triangles refer to TP condition. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The nature of “irrational” rejections in the Ultimatum Game have been investigated, by 
having participants perform a modified version of the paradigm in which they were asked to play 
for themselves or on behalf of a third party. To this purpose, I considered the rejection rate of the 
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offers as a behavioral measure and both the related skin conductance activity and the subjective 
ratings as indexes of emotional activation. A dissociation between behavioral and emotional 
responses was found: participants rejected an equal amount of small offers in the UG (but not in 
the control task) irrespective of whether these addressed oneself or a third-party; however they 
exhibited an increased negative emotional arousal when about to reject the most unfair offer 
addressing oneself (but not a third party). The account according to which rejections in the UG 
are irrational responses driven exclusively by negative emotions should therefore be 
reconsidered. 
The well-documented pattern of accepting fair offers and increasing the rate of rejection 
as offers become less fair was replicated (Bolton & Zwick, 1995; Roth, 1995; Guth, Huck & 
Muller, 2001; Sanfey et al., 2003). In keeping with what predicted by Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004), participants showed the same behavior even when playing on behalf of a third party. This 
pattern was not found in the control task, in which participants had to either accept or reject 
money given by the computer. This allows to concluding that, even though the responder's 
personal gain is the same in both UG and control task, in the UG, only the perception of an 
unfair split of money drives him/her to reject these offers choosing the so called non-utilitarian or 
“irrational” solution.  
The analysis of the electrodermal activity revealed an increase of offer-related SCR 
amplitudes whilst playing the UG, relative to the FW, and when one’s own interest, relative to a 
third party’s, was at stake. No significant effects associated with the factor GAIN were found 
thus suggesting an equal amount of emotional arousal irrespective of the magnitude of the offers. 
However, the analysis of emotional ratings revealed a significant increase of negative emotions 
associated with the most unfair condition (1 Euro out of 10), a significant increase of positive 
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emotions associated with the most fair condition (5 Euros out of 10) and no significant emotional 
activation during mid-value offers (3 Euros out of 10). Thus, the significant increase of SCR 
amplitudes is assumed to be associated with the both fair and unfair conditions in the UG (as 
opposed of the FW) could well reflect an increased emotional arousal irrespective of valence. In 
the case of the mid-value offers, it can be argued that SCR is more likely to reflect cognitive 
effort (Boucsein, 1992), as mid-value offers in the UG are usually associated with the longest 
response times, and with a larger N350 after the presentation of the offer (Polezzi et al., 2008), 
which usually occurs when ambiguous stimuli are processed (e.g. Schendan & Kutas, 2003). 
Finally, when the focus was on the trials associated with small offers (1 Euro), which in 
the case of the UG are the most unfair and are associated with largest negative emotional 
activation, a significant increase of SCR was found when rejecting (rather than accepting) offers 
addressing oneself. Such an increase (reminiscent to the one first described by van’t Wout et al., 
2006) was not found when the offers were directed at a third-party. Thus, if rejections are 
emotionally driven, as they are not utilitarian in nature (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Pillutla & 
Murninghan, 1996), we would expect to find an increase in the electrodermal activity when 
participants reject (compared with when they accept) small offers also when these address a 
third-party. Instead, these data suggest that participants’ rejections and their emotional reaction 
are independent, although co-occurring when participants play the UG for themselves. 
An alternative explanation for the responder’s behavior can be related to the notion of 
context-dependent fairness proposed by Zamir and colleagues (Winter & Zamir, 2005; Zamir, 
2001), according to which the sense of equity may change depending on both the person engaged 
in the social interaction dynamic, and the nature of this dynamic. For instance, Winter and Zamir 
(2005), reported a modified version of the UG in which the proposer played with virtual-
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responders which could be either much more tolerant or unforgiving to unfair offers than real 
human responders. They found that the proposers quickly adapted their behavior to the virtual-
responders, by behaving unfairly with the tolerant and fairly with the unforgiving responders. 
This is similar to what happens in the Dictator Game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 
1994; Bolton & Zwick, 1995), in which the proposer cannot have his offers rejected by the 
responder and, therefore, behaves far less fairly than in the UG. All these observations suggest 
that, in the UG, proposers’ behavior is directly affected by the tolerance to unfairness he expects 
in the responder. Even though rejections in the UG are irrational from an individualistic 
perspective, in that the money loss does not increase the responder's chance of having better 
offers in the remaining part of the experimental session, they can be considered rational from a 
collectivistic point of view, because they are supposed to lead the proposers to play fairly and, 
consequently, to an increase in the overall gain for the population of the responders (Zamir, 
2001). The account according to which the responder’s rejections are utilitarian is in agreement 
with behavioral results I have presented here. In this study, participants were told prior to the 
experiment that their starting stakes depended on how previous players had decided to split the 
money; it is therefore likely that they felt part of a group in which cooperation led to a 
maximization of everyone’s gain. Thus the participants’ rejections, on behalf of the third party, of 
the offers which are considered unfair, might reflect the will of preventing a bargain which, if 
accepted, would be detrimental for the population of the responders (Zamir, 2001). Critically, 
this account does not necessarily predict that the rejection should be associated with an increased 
negative emotional arousal.  
That emotions do play a role in the UG is demonstrated by other studies (e.g., Harlé & 
Sanfey, 2007; Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006; van’t Wout, Chang and Sanfey, 2010) 
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as well as by the present study, when participants played in the UG in the MS condition. In fact, 
it is not excluded that other emotional responses might have entered in this social interaction. It 
is plausible, for instance, that altruistic feelings and motivations similar to those described by 
Moll, et al. (2006) with regard to charitable donation, contribute to act in the same way both for 
oneself and on behalf of another person, by rejecting the unfair behavior. What our findings seem 
to suggest is that negative emotions are not always the key-mechanism underlying the 
responder’s rejections. These emotions might be triggered whenever one’s own interest is at 
stake, and not be the ultimate cause of this behavior.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss a study in which the issue is further investigated by 
using the fMRI, which has helped to disentangle between areas associated with the rejections in 
the MS and in the TP conditions.  
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Chapter 3 
Disentangling self- and fairness- related neural 
mechanisms: an fMRI study. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  As discussed in the previous chapter, since the UG is a task which primarily focuses 
on self-interest, it does not allow disentangling whether rejections are driven primarily by anger 
or direct personal frustration, elicited by the perception of being treated badly (Emotional theory) 
or by more general considerations about fairness, such as the wish to discourage unfair behavior 
or violations of social norm. Fairness sensitivity is assumed to emerge from the complex 
integration of cognitive, emotional and motivational mechanisms (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza and 
Zahn, 2008) and may lead to behavior which optimizes the aggregate welfare. In this 
perspective, UG’s rejections might be considered a pro-social act, as they lead proposers to less 
unfair behavior in future interactions (Zamir, 2001; Civai et al., 2010), thereby increasing the 
overall gain of the population of responders (Fairness theory). Crucially, although both 
Emotional and Fairness theories consider rejections to be related at least to some extent to one’s 
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emotional state, according to the Fairness theory rejections are not considered exclusively 
emotionally-driven, and might occur even in a neutral – i.e. non-personal – context where anger 
or personal frustration are not involved. In the previous chapter, it has been described how the 
dissociation between the behavioral and the emotional responses suggests that rejections might 
be associated with increased emotional arousal when one’s own interest is at stake (see also van't 
Wout et al., 2006), despite occurring also in a context in which unfairness is directed to a third 
party (that is, free of or with reduced emotional arousal); therefore, these data suggest that 
rejections are prevalently fairness-driven. 
 These findings raise the question about the functional properties of brain regions 
previously associated with the rejection of unfair offers in the UG, such as the anterior insula -
AI- and the medial prefrontal cortex -MPFC- (for a review of the neural correlates of the UG, see 
the Introduction, paragraph 1.2), and whether their neural activity reflects processes related to the 
self, or processes related to the rejections of an unfair offer per se which, consistent with the data 
presented in chapter 2, should be common to both the myself –MS- and the third party –TP- 
conditions. The functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) allowed to measuring blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal when healthy participants were engaged in the paradigm 
described in the previous chapter. For the fMRI analyses, unlike the previous study, a 3 x 2 
factorial design was considered, with TASK (UG Rejections, UG Acceptances, Free Win –FW-) 
and TARGET (Myself –MS-, Third-Party –TP-) as factors, and, consequently, 6 conditions: 
UR_MS, rejected trials when playing UG for oneself; UA_MS, accepted trials when playing UG 
for oneself; FW_MS, Free Win task addressing oneself; and, respectively, UR_TP, UA_TP, 
FW_TP, in which the participants performed the UG and FW tasks on behalf of a third party. Of 
crucial interest are the functional properties of regions such as the AI and the MPFC. In 
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particular if these regions code processes related exclusively to fairness, then their activity 
should be associated with contrasts testing for effects of the UG (as opposed to FW) offers and 
the rejection (as opposed to acceptances) thereof, which are shared across MS and TP conditions 
[e.g., (UR_MS + UA_MS + UR_TP + UA_TP)/2 – (FW_MS + FW_TP) and (UR_MS + 
UR_TP) – (UAm +UAt)], as both targets share the same amount of unfairness in the UG offers. 
Alternatively, if neural activity of these regions reflects the direct involvement of the Self in an 
unfair division, then it should be significantly associated with the interactions of 
TASK*TARGET, as reflected in the contrasts testing self-specific increases of neural activity 
during the assessment of UG offers [i.e., ((UR_MS + UA_MS)/2 – FW_MS) – ((UR_TP + 
UA_TP)/2 – FW_TP)] and the rejection thereof [i.e., (UR_MS – UA_MS) – (UR_TP – 
UA_TP)]. 
 
3.2 Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-three (9 females) subjects took part in the experiment. None of the participants had 
any history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
subjects, who were naive to the purpose of the experiment. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee. 
 
3.2.2 Task and Stimuli 
Task, stimuli and experimental set-up were similar to the ones described in chapter 2. 
Participants underwent one session of thirty minutes, in which they played as responders in a 
modified version of the UG. At each trial, participants were told that another participant (i.e., the 
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proposer), seated at the time of the experiment at a computer station just outside the MRI room, 
was given a 10 € note, and that he/she had to split this money with the participant (responder). 
Participants were told that the proposer was free to decide how to divide the money (e.g., he/she 
could keep most of the money to him/herself; likewise, he/she could divide the money equally, 
etc.), while knowing that the responder was free to accept or reject the offer and hence decide 
whether or not the division was going to take place. Subjects performed either the UG or a 
control task (Free-Win [FW]), in which they accepted/rejected money provided by the computer. 
In both UG and FW tasks, offers ranged from 1 to 5€ -although the instructions were given to 
induce in the participants the belief that they were interacting with a human fellow as the 
proposer, participants were presented with offers defined a priori by the experimenter-. 
Furthermore, within UG, we distinguished between trials which were accepted/rejected by the 
participants (participants seldom reject FW offers -see Results Section and chapter 2-). Finally, in 
both tasks trials were presented so that offers either addressed participants themselves or a third 
party. All offers were presented in written (font: Arial, font: 28) and their content varied 
according to the task employed, the target of the offer and the amount of money offered (e.g., “I 
offer you 2 euros out of 10”/“I offer to the next participant 2 euros out of 10” [UG]; “You are 
given 2 € for free”/“The next participant is given 2 € for free” [FW]). All offers were followed by 
the question “Do you accept?”/”Do you accept on her/his behalf?”  
  After the whole experimental session an informal debrief was carried out to assess 
whether participants believed whether offers were genuinely human. None of the participants 
exhibited doubts about the cover story. 
 
3.2.3 Experimental Set-Up 
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Participants lay supine in the MR scanner with their head fixated by firm foam pads. 
Stimuli were presented using Presentation 11.0 (Neurobehavioral Systems) and projected to a 
VisuaStim Goggles system (Resonance Technology). Behavioral responses were recorded by 
pressing the corresponding keys of an MRI-compatible response device (Lumitouch, Lightwave 
Medical Industries, CST Coldswitch Technologies). 
For each experimental trial, participants were first presented with the offer for 4500 msec, 
followed by a blank screen ranging from 4750 msec to 6750 msec with an incremental step of 
500 msec. The question “Do you accept (on his/her behalf) ?” was then presented for 2000 msec. 
Trials were followed by an inter-trial interval ranging from 4750 msec to 6750 msec with an 
incremental step of 500 msec. This trial set-up allowed us to measure putative increases of 
BOLD signal prior to the delivery of the key-presses, i.e., during the presentation of the offer. 
This yielded a factorial design, with TASK (UG, FW), TARGET (MS, TP), and GAIN (1, 2, 3, 4, 
5 euros) as factors. Each experimental session comprised 105 randomized trials, including 100 
experimental trials [2 OFFER x 2 TARGET x 5 GAIN x 5 repetitions] and 5 “null events” in 
which an empty screen replaced the stimuli. 
fMRI data acquisition. A Siemens Trio 3-T whole-body scanner was used to acquire both 
T1-weighted anatomical images and gradient-echo planar T2-weighted MRI images with blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast. The scanning sequence was a trajectory-based 
reconstruction sequence with a repetition time (TR) of 2200 msec, an echo time (TE) of 30 msec, 
a flip angle of 90 degrees, a slice thickness of 3 mm, and no gap between slices. For each 
subject, 878 volumes were acquired during the whole experimental session. 
 
3.2.4 Behavioral and imaging data processing 
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For each subject, and for each condition, the rejection rate was calculated across all 5 
repetitions, and used in a TASK X TARGET X GAIN Repeated Measures ANOVA. Statistical 
analysis was performed using SPSS 11.5 Software (SPSS Inc., Chertsey UK). 
Image processing and statistical analysis were performed using the SPM8 software 
package (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each subject, the first six volumes were 
discarded. To correct for head motion, the functional images were then realigned to the new first 
functional image (Ashburner and Friston, 2004), normalized to a template based on 152 brains 
from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), and then smoothed by convolution with a 8 mm 
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
Data were then fed into a first level analysis using the general linear model framework 
(Kiebel and Holmes, 2004) implemented in SPM8. On the first level, for each individual subject, 
we fitted a linear regression model to the data. For the UG only, a distinction between rejected 
and accepted offers was made (participants seldom reject FW offers – see Results section and 
Civai et al., 2010). This yielded a 3 (TASK: UG Rejections, UG Acceptances, FW) x 2 
(TARGET: MS, TP) factorial design with 6 conditions: UR_MS, UA_MS, FW_MS, UR_TP, 
UA_TP, FW_TP. For each of these conditions the onset of the offer and the onset of the text 
string prompting a button press were modeled independently through a stick functions (see 
Figure 3.1b). For each of the resulting 12 vectors, I also accounted for putative linear changes of 
neural activity across all repetitions by using the time modulation option implemented in SPM, 
which creates a new regressor in which the trial order is modulated parametrically. Furthermore, 
regressors testing the parametric modulation of the factor GAIN were included: distinct 
regressors were modeled for the two onsets within the trial structure (offer, response), the two 
levels of TARGET (MS, TP) and for TASK which was UG and FW, but not for different 
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responses within UG trials. This yielded 32 vectors [12 stick functions + 12 time modulation 
vectors + 8 gain modulation vectors], each of which was convolved with a canonical 
haemodynamic response function and associated with a vector describing its first order time 
derivative. Finally, to account for movement-related variance, six differential realignment 
parameters were included as regressors. Low-frequency signal drifts were filtered using a cutoff 
period of 128 sec. 
 Please notice that, due to intrinsic properties of the bargaining game, regressors testing for 
specific responses (e.g., UR_MS) correlate strongly with regressors testing for response-
independent effects of offer size (see behavioral results). Following Andrade, Paradis, Rouquette, 
and Poline (1999), we assume that by inserting two correlated regressors in the same model, the 
parameters associated with each of them would be estimated on that portion of variance that is 
not shared with the confound (e.g., effects of rejections/acceptances would be estimated on 
variance that is independent from the one explained by the size of the offer). Although realizing 
that modeling both responses and offer size might lead to sensitivity problems, by doing so it is 
insured that the results (if any) could be uniquely interpreted, thus ruling out potential 
confounding effects of the correlated regressor (Andrade et al., 1999). 
 The first level analysis of each subject yielded images describing the parameter estimates 
associated with each of the vectors modeled. Of key interest for the current purposes are those 
parameter estimates associated with the 6 conditions of our 3 x 2 design, exclusively when the 
offer was presented (but not when the response was triggered). These images were then fed into a 
second-level flexible factorial design with a within-subject factor of six levels using a random 
effects analysis (Penny and Holmes, 2004). The effects of the offer size were also assessed by 
feeding, in a similar second-level flexible factorial design, the four parameter estimates testing 
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for the parametrical modulation of the factor GAIN (also in this case, the parameters where only 
those associated with the onset of the offer, and not with the onset of the string prompting the 
button presses). 
 For each activated region, the percentage signal changes were calculated over the local 
maxima parameter estimates using the MarsBar toolbox (Brett et al., 2002). Further statistical 
analyses were performed over the extracted percentage signal change values to further 
investigate the functional properties of the areas of activation. This statistical analysis was 
performed with SPSS 11.5. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Behavioral results 
One subject never rejected UG offers, neither in the MS nor in the TP condition, whereas 
another subject never rejected third-party UG offers only. The remaining 21 subjects rejected UG 
offers in both MS and TP conditions. For each of the 23 subjects and for each condition, the 
rejection rates were calculated across all 5 repetitions, and used in a 2 TASK (UG, FW) x 2 
TARGET (MS, TP) x 5 GAIN (1-5 €) Repeated Measures ANOVA. Results indicated a 
significant main effect of TASK (F(1, 22) = 123.89, p < 0.001), with the UG leading to a larger 
number of rejections than the FW, as well as a main effect of GAIN (F(4,88) = 58.73, p < 0.001), 
with lower offers being rejected more often than higher offers. These effects were, however, 
driven by a TASK * GAIN interaction, which was also significant (F(4,88) = 63.44, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that lower offers were rejected significantly more often than higher offers in the UG 
but not in the FW (see Figure 3.1). None of the remaining effects of the ANOVA was significant. 
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Figure 3.1. Behavioral results. Rejection Rates are plotted as a function of Gain in both UG (black 
circles) and FW (white triangles) tasks and MS and TP conditions. 
 
3.3.2 Neural Activations 
Unless stated otherwise, we report exclusively areas of activation which survived an extent 
threshold > 176 consecutively activated voxels (corresponding to a p < 0.05, corrected for 
multiple comparisons across the whole brain), with an underlying height threshold of t > 3.17 
(corresponding to p < 0.001, uncorrected). Please see Table 1 for the full set of results. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Voxels showing significant increases of neural activity associated with TASK, TARGET and 
TASK*TARGET interaction. All clusters survived a threshold corresponding to p < 0.05, corrected for 
multiple comparisons across the whole brain, with an underlying height threshold corresponding to p < 
51 
 
0.001 (uncorrected). Only contrasts yielding significant activations are reported. Coordinates are in 
standard MNI space.  
REGION SIDE 
Coordinates 
X Y Z 
1: Main effect of TASK: UG > FW 
    (URm + UAm + URt + UAt)/2 – (FWm + FWt) 
Supramarginal Gyrus 
R 
42 -34 38 
Precuneus 10 -64 38 
Calcarine Gyrus 10 -62 10 
Supramarginal Gyrus 
L 
-40 -36 38 
Precuneus 
-8 -62 36 
Calcarine Gyrus 
-10 -66 10 
Midbrain/PAG R 10 -4 -10 
L -6 -12 -10 
Anterior Insula L -34 16 0 
Supplementary Motor Area 
L 
-2 18 44 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
-8 32 14 
Precentral Gyrus L -40 -6 52 
Anterior Insula R 30 22 2 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 36 10 54 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L 50 -62 -12 
 
    
Inferior Occipital Gyrus L 36 -84 -12 
R -30 -78 -8 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 48 4 26 
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2: Main effect of TASK: Rejected > Accepted Ultimatum Game offers 
    (UR_MS + UR_TP) – (UA_MS + UA_TP) 
Midbrain/PAG L 
-6 -26 -6 
-2 2 -10 
3: Main effect of TARGET: MS>TP 
    (UR_MS + UA_MS + FW_MS) – (UR_TP + UA_TP + FW_TP) 
Middle Orbital Gyrus 
R 
-2 38 -6 
Superior Medial Gyrus 6 54 2 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 
48 46 -6 
26 22 -18 
4: Main effect of TARGET: TP>MS 
    (UR_TP + UA_TP + FW_TP) – (UR_MS + UA_MS + FW_MS) 
Lingual Gyrus 
R 
14 -78 -6 
Superior Occipital Gyrus 26 -82 20 
Lingual Gyrus 
L -12 -82 -14 
Superior Occipital Gyrus 
-16 -92 24 
     Inferior Parietal Cortex L -44 -68 28 
Middle Temporal Gyrus L -60 -8 -14 
5: OFFER*TARGET interaction: UG > FW, specifically for MS 
    ((UR_MS + UA_MS)/2 – FW_MS) – ((UR_TP + UA_TP)/2 – FW_TP) 
Superior Medial Gyrus R/L 0 58 8 
 
Main effects. I first tested for regions exhibiting significant increases of neural activity for 
UG as opposed to FW [i.e., (UR_MS + UA_MS + UR_TP + UA_TP)/2 – (FW_MS + FW_TP)]. 
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Bilateral activations were found at the level of the calcarine gyrus, the inferior occipital gyrus, 
the inferior parietal cortex, and the anterior aspect of the insula. Activation of the midbrain, of 
the anterior cingulate cortex, of the left precentral gyrus, the right middle frontal and temporal 
gyri was also found (Figure 3.2). 
I next tested for increases of neural activity associated with offers addressing oneself 
(irrespective of whether these were UG or FW) as opposed to offers addressing a third-party [i.e., 
(UR_MS + UA_MS + FW_MS) – (UR_TP +UA_TP+ FW_TP)]. Such increases were found at 
the level of the medial prefrontal cortex (Figure 3.4b, violet cluster), including the most ventral 
part (14 mm below the inter-commissural line), and extending to the superior medial gyrus (2 
mm above the inter-commissural line). Further activation was found at the level of the inferior 
frontal gyrus. 
Moreover, regions exhibiting increased neural activity when about to reject (as opposed 
to accept) UG offers were tested [i.e., (UR_MS + UR_TP) – (UA_MS +UA_TP)]. This contrast 
revealed activation of midbrain regions, over and around the midbrain cluster revealed by the 
previous analysis. Following Sanfey et al. (2003), who reported the AI as most strongly active 
when participants were about to reject (rather than accept) UG offers, we also expected in our 
study the AI to be significantly associated with UG rejections. Therefore, a restricted analysis on 
the bilateral insula (AAL Atlas – Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) found a significant activation in 
the inferior aspect of the left AI (x = -36, y = 16, z = -4, t(107) = 4.05, p < 0.05, family-wise 
corrected for the region of interest). Figure 3.3a (yellow cluster) displays this increase in neural 
activity, which is < 5 mm distant from the left anterior insular region (MNI-converted 
coordinates x = -33 y = 14 z = 0) reported by Sanfey et al. (2003). Please notice that, in this 
analysis both participants’ responses and response-independent linear effects of the factor GAIN 
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in the UG were modeled (see Methods section); thus the parameters associated with rejections in 
the insula and midbrain should describe specific response effects, over and above those 
associated with the offer size (Andrade et al., 1999). In depth analysis was carried out on the 
percentage signal changes extracted from the cluster local maxima (see Figure 3.3c, left graph) to 
assess putative TARGET-modulations in this region. As not all participants rejected UG offers in 
both MS and TP condition (see behavioral results section), we used a Linear Mixed Model 
(McCulloch et al., 2008) which is more robust than a traditional ANOVA against missing cells. 
The model included RESPONSE (Accept, Reject) and TARGET (MS, TP) as fixed factors, and 
Subjects as random factor. A compound symmetry covariance structure was specified. We found 
a significant main effect of RESPONSE (F(1, 64.69) = 14.97, p < 0.001), reflecting an overall 
increase of insular activity when UG offers are about to be rejected, but neither a main effect of 
TARGET (F(1, 63.62) = 1.02, n.s.) nor a RESPONSE * TARGET interaction (F(1, 63.62) = 
0.19, n.s.) was observed. Finally, paired-samples t-tests confirmed that the insular RESPONSE 
effect survived analysis when considering separately UG offers addressing oneself (URm – 
UAm: t(21) = 3.28, p < 0.01) and the third-party (URt – UAt: t(20) = 2.15, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 3.2. Surface renderings of the functional contrasts testing regions exhibiting a larger neural activity 
when subjects were engaged in UG, rather than FW. 
 
Interactions. I tested for significant increases of neural activity associated with the UG 
(but not the FW), exclusively when offers addressed oneself and not the third-party [i.e., ((URm 
+ UAm)/2 – FWm) – ((URt + UAt)/2 – FWt)]. This analysis isolated the medial prefrontal 
cortex. Figure 3.3b displays this region (green cluster) together with the adjacent (and partially-
overlapping) region revealed by the analysis of the main effect of TARGET (violet cluster), thus 
showing that the region revealed by the interaction term lies more dorsal and frontal with respect 
to the region involved in processing offers addressing oneself. In depth analysis was carried out 
on the percentage signal changes extracted from the cluster local maxima in order to assess 
RESPONSE effects in this region. Therefore, a Linear Mixed Model was carried out with 
RESPONSE (Accept, Reject) and TARGET (MS, TP) as fixed factors and Subjects as random 
factor. A compound symmetry covariance structure was specified. No effect of RESPONSE (F(1, 
64.44) = 0.06, n.s.) was found, but a significant main effect of TARGET (F(1, 63.60) = 14.81, p 
< 0.001), reflecting an overall increase of MPFC activity when UG offers addressed oneself (as 
opposed to a third party), and a significant RESPONSE * TARGET interaction (F(1, 63.60) = 
5.88, p < 0.05), revealing that the self-specific increase of MPFC activity in the UG was larger 
during rejections than acceptances (see Figure 3.3c, middle graph). 
I also tested for regions exhibiting specific increases for rejected (as opposed to accepted) 
UG offers, specifically when they addressed oneself, rather than the third party: [(URm – URt) – 
(UAm – UAt)]. However, no significant effect was found, neither when testing for the whole 
brain, nor when restricting our interest on MPFC and the left insula. We tested also for 
significant increases of neural activity for UG offers (and the rejection thereof) specifically when 
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these address the third-party [i.e., ((URt + UAt)/2 – FWt) – ((URm + UAm)/2 – FWm) and (URt 
– URm) – (UAt – UAm)]. No significant effects were found. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. (A) Sagittal (x = -36), coronal (y = 16) and axial (z = -4) sections displaying the functional 
contrast testing UG > FW (blue activation) and, within UG offers, the contrast testing Rejections > 
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Acceptances (yellow activation). Light pink activations refer to regions significantly associated with both 
contrasts. (B) Sagittal (x = 0), coronal (y = 58) and axial (z = 8) sections displaying the functional contrast 
testing the interaction term (green activations) and MS > TP (violet activation). Light green activations 
refer to regions significantly associated with both contrasts. (C) The parameter estimates associated with 
representative voxels of the activated areas are displayed together with S.E.M. error bars. Red bars refer 
to offers addressing oneself, whereas cyan bars refer to offers addressing a third-party. 
 
Simple effects. We focused our attention only on TP. We first investigated for effects of 
the Ultimatum Game [(UR_TP + UA_TP)/2 – FW_TP], and isolated, reminiscently to the 
activation displayed in Figure 3.2, the intraparietal sulcus (extending to the inferior parietal 
cortex) bilaterally and midbrain structures over and around the substantia nigra and the red 
nucleus. Interestingly, the midbrain activation overlaps not only previous results associated with 
the main effect Ultimatum Game > Free Win, but also the midbrain region associated with 
Rejections > Acceptances. We then tested for increases of neural activity associated to rejections, 
rather than acceptances (URt – UAt). No suprathreshold activation was found 
Parametrical modulation of GAIN. No region showed significant effects associated with 
the parameters testing the parametrical modulation of the factor GAIN, at least when using 
rigorous correction for multiple comparisons for the whole brain. We then restricted our 
hypothesis on the ventral portion of the MPFC isolated when testing the main effect of TARGET 
(see Figure 3b, violet blob). We therefore extracted the four parameters testing the GAIN effect 
from the cluster’s representative voxel (-2, -38, -6) and subjected them to one-sample t-tests in 
order to assess significant deviations from 0. Only the parameters testing effects of offers size in 
the FW_MS was found to be significantly larger than 0 (t(22) = 3.10, p < 0.01). This was not the 
case for the other three parameters (UG_MS: t(22) = 0.99; UG_TP: t(22) = 0.45; FW_TP: t(22) = 
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0.98). The same analysis was carried out on the peak from the inferior frontal activation (48, 46, 
-6) isolated as well through the main effect of TARGET (see Table 1). In this case, however, 
none of the parameters were significantly different from 0 (UG_MS: t(22) = 0.07; UG_TP: t(22) 
= -0.69; FW_MS: t(22) = -0.38; FW_TP: t(22) = 0.59). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
I employed the modified Ultimatum Game (UG) paradigm described in chapter 2, in which 
participants played either for themselves (MS) or on behalf of a third-party. Using fMRI, I found 
the anterior insula involved in dealing with unfair offers affecting both oneself and others, as 
revealed by the contrast testing for increased neural activity associated with rejections (as 
opposed to acceptances) in both the MS and TP condition. Instead, the middle-anterior portion of 
the MPFC was recruited exclusively when the unfair offers were related to oneself only. These 
data converge with, but also extend, previous studies: I have not only mapped the neural 
mechanisms underlying people’s reaction to unfairness, but we also disentangled those processes 
reflecting judgments related to unfair behavior (fairness), from those related to the 
cognitive/emotional processes when oneself needs to deal with unfair behavior (self-effect). 
 
3.4.1 Self-Specific Neural Networks 
Studies in the field of economics implicated both middle-anterior and ventral portions of 
the MPFC in tasks in which participants assessed the value of potential outcomes (see, Amodio 
and Frith, 2006, as review): for example, Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, and Glover 
(2005) associated the activity of part of the MPFC (z ≈ -6) with the computation of expected 
monetary value, whereas Coricelli and colleagues testing both healthy subjects with fMRI 
(Coricelli et al., 2005) and brain damaged patients (Camille, et al., 2004; Larquet, Coricelli, 
59 
 
Opolczynski, and Thibaut, 2010) implicated a more ventral part of MPFC (extending to z ≈ -14) 
in anticipated regret associated with monetary decision. Neuropsychological studies testing the 
classical UG task report results in line with those from neuroimaging studies: whereas Koenigs 
and Tranel (2007) described patients with MPFC damage (from ventral to middle-anterior 
portions) more prone to reject unfair offers, Moretti et al. (2009) limit Koenigs’ findings to the 
case in which bargaining offers are described as abstract sums to be received later, rather than 
visible and immediately-available banknotes, thus suggesting a MPFC role in representing the 
value of abstract outcomes (and, therefore, of the economic benefit of unfair bargaining). The 
role of MPFC in economic choice is, however, not limited to assessing the value of possible 
outcomes, rather MPFC is also suggested to be involved in decision making and mentalizing. For 
instance, Coricelli and Nagel (2009) associated activity of parts of the MPFC (z ≈ -9, +24) with 
high-level reasoning as assessed with the Beauty Contest, a game which assesses the subject’s 
ability to develop strategies based on representations of competitors’ putative choices. Crucially, 
in all these studies the role of MPFC is established by tasks exposing directly participants to 
potential gains or losses. I tested MPFC sensitivity to potential monetary gain in a TP condition, 
and found activation of the middle-anterior and ventral MPFC (extending ventrally to z ≈-14) 
whenever participants themselves (but not a Third-Party) received money (irrespective of 
whether the received amount of money resulted from a social interaction (UG) or was given “for 
free” (FW)). Consistently, the activity of the ventral MPFC increased linearly with the amount of 
money participants (but not the third-party) gained in the FW task, thus insuring the involvement 
of this region in personal gain rather than in mere self-reflective processing. Please notice that no 
linear effect of offer size was observed in this region during UG offers addressing oneself. 
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Indeed, at variance with FW, in UG differences in offer size do not reflect exclusively the 
amount of money gained, but rather the amount of unfairness in the proposer’s choices. 
The functional properties of the middle-anterior aspect of the MPFC are heterogeneous and 
involve the co-occurrence of cognitive, emotional and social processes. First of all, the middle 
MPFC responds to emotional events: for example, extensive MPFC activation was found during 
passive processing of emotional pictures or (Lee, et al., 2004) or words (Beauregard, et al., 
1997), or in studies in which participants were asked to rate explicitly the emotional content of 
pictures (Lane, Fink, Chau, and Dolan, 1997; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, and Raichle, 2001; 
Dolcos, LaBar, and Cabeza, 2004). Furthermore, Ochsner, et al. (2004) reported activation of the 
middle-anterior MPFC (z ≈ 8) when participants judged their own affective state, whereas 
Peelen, Atkinson, and Vuilleumier (2010) reported a slightly superior region (z ≈ 21) coding 
emotional states irrespective of whether these are experienced through voice, facial expression or 
body language. The middle-anterior MPFC (z from 2 to 17) has also been implicated in self-
reflection, as suggested by studies engaging participants in self-judgments about traits/adjectives 
or episodic memory (Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, von Cramon, 2002; Kelley, et al., 2002) and in 
mentalizing (z from 3 to 48), that is when participants were asked (through storyboard or 
pictorial tasks) to assess others’ mental states (Goel, Grafman, Sadato, and Hallett, 1995; Saxe 
and Powell, 2006). Finally, middle-anterior MPFC activation (z from -12 to 24) has been 
reported for moral judgments and reasoning (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen, 
2001; Moll et al., 2002; Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Schwintowski, and Villringer, 2003; 
Green, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen, 2004; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, and 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), whereas its dysfunction has been described leading to impaired moral 
behavior (Koenigs, et al., 2007; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, and di Pellegrino, 2007; 
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Krajbich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, and Camerer, 2009; Moll, et al., 2011). Overlaps between 
these different cognitive processes have often been suggested: indeed, whereas Jenkins, Macrae, 
and Mitchell (2008) describe mentalizing effects as reflective of self-referential processing, other 
studies suggest a privileged MPFC role in mentalizing about others’ emotional states (Hynes, 
Baird, and Grafton, 2006; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, and Aharon-Peretz, 2006; Gilbert, et 
al., 2006). Likewise, self-referential and emotional processing in MPFC are often confounded 
one another, as performance in emotional rating might be a self-referential task (Amodio and 
Frith, 2006) or the Self can be considered as an emotional entity per se (Modinos, Ormel, and 
Aleman, 2009). 
I here report an activation of the middle-anterior portion (z ≈ 8) of the MPFC (Figure 4b, 
green cluster) which may reflect some of these complex cognitive processes. Indeed, as for the 
case of the more ventral portion of the MPFC, it was modulated specifically in the MS (but not 
TP) condition. At variance with the ventral MPFC, the modulation was restricted to the UG (but 
not the FW), that is only when a potential monetary gain was the result of a social interaction. 
Furthermore, analysis on the extracted percent signal changes revealed a larger MS > TP effect in 
those UG trials that were about to be rejected than accepted, suggesting an additional recruitment 
of this area when facing self-directed unfair behavior. This result is reminiscent of data described 
in the last chapter, which showed enhanced skin conductance responses associated with rejection 
(rather than acceptance) of unfair UG offers in the MS condition. Taken together the data suggest 
that this middle-anterior MPFC activity might be related to emotional arousal evoked by an 
unfair offer related to the self. Amodio and Frith (2006) suggested that value-related 
representations in the ventral MPFC extend the more anterior (and superior), the more complex 
they become, and that they integrate with socio-affective processes. In this study, this 
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progression is showed in the context of monetary gain/loss when participants are personally 
involved in the bargaining. 
 
3.4.2 Fairness-Related Neural Networks 
A significant increases of neural activity during the UG (with respect to the FW) in the 
right anterior cingulate cortex, the right middle frontal gyrus, the precuneus bilaterally and the 
inferior parietal lobe bilaterally, extending to the intraparietal sulcus, was found. In line with 
Sanfey et al (2003), these activations are likely to reflect a large number of processes underlying 
task performance, amongst which the increased calculation effort (Le Clec’, 2000), the cognitive 
conflict (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, and Cohen, 1999; MacLeod and MacDonald, 
2000), and the need of maintaining the task’s goal in working memory (Miller and Cohen, 2001) 
all can be subsumed. 
The present study implicates the left anterior insula not only in the analysis testing effects 
of UG (as opposed of FW) in both MS and TP condition, but also in the analysis testing 
rejections (as opposed to acceptances) of UG offers. In both analyses, the voxels isolated were 
close (i.e., within < 5 mm) to the ones previously reported by Sanfey et al. (2003) as sensitive to 
UG rejections (corresponding to our MS condition), or by Tabibnia et al. (2008) as more 
recruited in those participants who often rejected unfair offers. Furthermore, activations close to 
this region (< 8 mm) were involved also in anticipation of one’s monetary gain/loss (Ernst, et al.  
2004; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, and Glover, 2005; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz, 
2006; Knutson, Bhanji, Cooney, Atlas, and Gotlib, 2008; Engelmann, Capra, Noussair, and 
Berns, 2009). Given that previous studies reported this portion of the anterior insula ( < 8 mm) 
involved in negative experiences, such as disgust (Shapira et al., 2003), pain (Peyron et al., 1999; 
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Hui et al., 2000; Mohr, Leyendecker, and Helmchen, 2008) or thirst (Denton et al., 1999; de 
Araujo, Kringelbach, Rolls, and McGlone, 2003), it might be argued that many economical tasks 
are emotionally-grounded, and that the activation of the anterior insula in these tasks is a 
physiological marker of negative emotional involvement. Thus, these results might be 
considered, contrary to the evidences reported in chapter 2, consistent with TP rejections as 
negative emotional as rejections associated with the MS condition (see also Sanfey et al., 2003; 
Chang and Sanfey, 2009). This view, however, does not acknowledge that the same portion of the 
anterior insula (< 8 mm) has also been associated with processing positive events (Malhi, et al. 
2007), or cognitive processes which are not necessarily emotionally-grounded, such as motor 
control (Aramaki, Honda, Okada, and Sadato, 2006) or attention allocation (Steel et al., 2001; 
Kelly, et al., 2004; Durston, Mulder, Casey, Ziermans, and van Engeland, 2006; Chikazoe et al., 
2009). Furthermore, previous studies suggest that the anterior insula activity associated with 
negative emotions is more than a physiological response of one’s emotional/somatic state, but 
rather reflects explicit awareness of what one’s and others’ states might be (Craig, 2003, 2009; 
Singer, Critchley, and Preuschoff, 2009; Lamm and Singer, 2010): thus, not only a physiological 
index of emotional arousal – such as electrodermal activity and heart beat – but a structure 
involved in explicitly monitoring these indexes (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, and Dolan, 
2004); not only a region involved in detecting a noxious event, but also in coding its perceived 
unpleasantness (Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, and Bushnell, 1997; Craig, Chen, Bandy, and 
Reiman, 2000), or its predictability from preceding cues (Porro et al., 2002; Atlas, Bolger, 
Lindquist, and Wager, 2010); not only responsive to negative visual stimuli, but involved in 
explicitly assess their negative (e.g., painful) content (Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, and Decety, 
2007; Gu and Han, 2007). 
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Recent accounts suggest that the anterior insula integrates information about modality-
specific feelings with cognitive processes, individual preferences and contextual information in 
order to promote behavioral responses (Singer et al., 2009; Lamm and Singer, 2010). In this 
perspective this region is an ideal candidate for mediating fairness-related behavior which 
emerges from the integration of cognitive, emotional and motivational mechanisms (Moll et al., 
2008). Indeed, anterior insula activity to stimuli depicting people in pain has been shown to be 
affected by contextual information about these people, such as their status in the community 
(Decety, Echols, and Correll , 2009) or their fairness in economic scenarios (Singer et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, this region mediates punishments of unfair behavior in social interactions not only 
in the UG (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008): for instance, Rilling et al. (2008) 
implicated coordinates proximal to ours (< 5 mm) in unreciprocated (as opposed to reciprocated) 
cooperation during the Prisoner’s Dilemma, King-Casas et al. (2008) associated the anterior 
insula (< 10 mm) with borderlines patients’ inability to maintain cooperation in a Trust Game, 
whereas Strobel et al. (2011) reported activations the same region (< 5 mm) when participants 
sanctioned unfair offers in the Dictator Game. In almost all these studies, the economical games 
affected directly participants’ gain/loss, thus leaving open the possibility that the insular activity 
they reported was reflective of emotional reactions to unfair treatment or concerns about one’s 
welfare. Strobel et al. (2011) found insular activity even when participants punished TP unfair 
offers in the Dictator Game, thus implicating this region also when the unfairness sanctioned was 
directed to someone else. However, TP punishments in Strobel et al. (2011) were costly for 
participants, thus still leaving open the possibility that the insula responded to emotional 
concerns about one’s money loss. This is not the case of this study in which participants choices 
in the TP did not affect their own pocket. Thus, it provides evidence in favor of the anterior 
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insula mediating fairness-related behavior. In this perspective, previous studies already described 
the anterior insula as endowed with “shared” properties, that is responding both when an 
emotional event is felt directly and perceived in others. This was the case of the experience of 
disgusting or pleasing tastes/odors (Wicker et al., 2003; Jabbi, Swart, and Keysers, 2007) or pain 
(Lamm, Decety, and Singer, 2011). However, to the best of our knowledge no study had thus far 
described shared properties in the insula when facing complex emotional/motivational responses, 
such as those involved in promoting pro-social behaviors, not only when this benefits oneself, 
but also when it benefits someone whom participants know nothing about. 
It still remains to be elucidated whether the fairness-related behavior associated with the 
anterior insula reflects a moral act, motivated by the wish of sanctioning an intentional unfair 
action, or inequity aversion, motivated by the wish of preventing an unfair division from taking 
place, irrespectively of its moral salience (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Both factors seem to 
contribute to rejections in the MS condition, as offers are rejected also when unfair divisions are 
randomly generated by a computer, although not as frequently as in the case of human-generated 
divisions (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006). Reminiscently to the case of 
randomly-generated offers, rejections of TP offers can hardly be interpreted as punishments, as 
the person affected by participants’ choice is not the one responsible of the unfair division and, 
therefore, is morally unaccountable. In this perspective, an interpretation of insular activity in 
terms of inequity aversion seems, at the present state, the most plausible. It should be mentioned, 
however, that an interpretation in terms of moral punishment is still possible, but only if we 
assume that the target of the punishing act is not a specific unfair individual, but the overall 
population of proposers, including those who might behave irrationally in subsequent 
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experimental sessions. Future studies will be conducted to investigate more thoroughly the role 
played by the insula in moral considerations and inequity aversion. 
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Chapter 4 
Driving principles in decision-making: the role of 
abstract social rules. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite the fact that, in its classical formulation, Game Theory (GT) fails to predict 
behavior in the UG, its predictions provide a useful benchmark. The classical formulation of GT 
(von Neumann Morgenstern, 1944) tried to predict the behavior of rational players, each 
choosing an action in a game where the profile of chosen actions delivers a consequence. 
Consequences have utility for players: in the classical concept of Nash, players try to maximize 
this utility taken the behavior of the others as given. To better understand what the GT predicts in 
the UG, let us take for a moment the amounts in the description of the extensive form game as 
measuring utility, rather than money. If we accept this identification, then GT predicts very little 
if we consider the equilibrium concept to be Nash equilibrium. For example, take an arbitrary 
amount x. A strategy profile (that is, a plan assigned to every player, describing a choice in every 
possible contingency) where the responder accepts an offer if and only if it is larger or equal to x, 
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and the proposer offers x, is a Nash equilibrium. If one adopts a more restrictive concept (e.g., 
the Subgame perfection, Selten, 1975)2, then equilibrium of this game of perfect information is 
found by backward induction and is unique if a zero offer is not allowed. In this equilibrium, the 
responder accepts any offer and the proposer offers the minimum amount. A large number of 
experiments, beginning with Güth et al. (1982), used money payments and found behavior 
substantially different from the offer of a minimal amount by the proposer and acceptance of any 
positive amount by the responder. (If or As) Money is not utility, thus the comparison with the 
behavior predicted by SP equilibrium has to be interpreted. Is there a discrepancy between game 
theoretic predictions and behavior of subjects? There are three possible ways to answer this 
question.  
1. A first answer takes monetary amounts as utilities, and explains the behavior of 
the proposer offering an amount larger than the minimum as due to failure to expect full rational 
behavior by the responder, who might reject a low offer (Weg & Zwick, 1994). This explanation 
is consistent with Nash equilibrium prediction, not subgame perfection. In particular it fails to 
explain the behavior of responders who reject low offers and receive a zero amount, when in the 
                                              
2
 Here is an example, that can be found in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, in order to clarify the difference 
between Nash equilibrium and Selten’s Subgame perfection: the Chain Store Paradox. Imagine that firm A has a 
number of chain stores in various locations and that firm B contemplates entering in one or more of these locations. 
If firm A threatens a price war, then firm B might be dissuaded from entering, not just in a particular market, but in 
any of A’s markets. In that case, it could well be worthwhile for A to threaten and, indeed, to carry out a price war in 
a single market. Knowing this, B does not enter. This is a Nash equilibrium. But Selten also observed that another 
Nash equilibrium was for B to enter. Why? B would realize that A would have losses in each market in which B 
entered and A carried out a price war. These losses, cumulatively, would not be worthwhile. By looking forward and 
reasoning backward (backward induction), B realizes that A will not carry on a price war, and therefore B enters. 
Which Nash equilibrium is the “right” one? Selten argued that it is the one where B enters because B thought 
through the whole sequence and realized that, from A’s viewpoint, a price war would be irrational. B’s strategy of 
entry and A’s strategy of avoiding a price war are “subgame perfect.” 
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same situation acceptance would give them a positive amount.   
2. A second way to explain observed behavior of experimental subjects and rescue 
game theoretic predictions is to postulate that monetary payments to a subject are very different 
from his utility for that outcome. This seems a natural route. Consider, for instance, the classical 
game of chicken: two players drive their car one against the other, and they can choose between 
swerve (S) and go straight (G). The utility that they derive does not of course depend only on the 
trajectory of their car: if a player chooses S, his utility is very different when he shares with the 
other the embarrassment for choosing S, and when he suffers the unique shame of being the only 
one to choose S. A full game theoretic approach to the problem of predicting behavior would 
require that preferences over outcomes of all players are elicited independently of the game. This 
can be done, for example, by asking the players to choose among random devices assigning 
payments to all players.  Once this is done (for example, once we have measured how much in 
the chicken game the subject prefers the outcome where both choose S to the one where he 
chooses S and the other G), then we can test the equilibrium prediction. In the case of the UG, 
one might conjecture that players may care about the payment to others (e.g., Guth 1988). 
Specifically, theories of inequality aversion (Bolton, 1991; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000) assume that utility of players are equal to the monetary amount received, minus 
a term which is proportional to the difference between the amounts of the two players. This term 
which is subtracted may be of different sizes depending on whether the monetary amount 
received by the subject is smaller or larger than the other’s.3 These choices are then used as 
                                              
3
 From Fehr & Schmidt (1999), p.882: “Formally, consider a set of  players indexed by  ∈ 	 1, . . . , 	, and let 

	  	
	, . . . , 
 denote the vector of monetary payoffs. The utility function of player 	 ∈ 	 1, . . . , 		is given by 
(1) 
  
  	 

	∑ max
  
, 0	  		


∑ max
  
, 0	 , 
where we assume that   	 	0   ! 1. In the two-player case (1) simplifies to 
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preferences to predict behavior in the UG. However the testing of the theory does not proceed by 
first establishing preferences over outcomes (of the player and the others), for example by 
offering choices of lotteries, and then using these elicited preferences to predict behavior in the 
UG. Instead, the behavior in the UG is used for both deriving preferences and testing behavior. 
Without a restriction given by an independent elicitation of preferences, rejecting of theories of 
inequality aversion becomes very hard to falsify. More precisely, if one assumes inequality 
averse preferences, then the only restriction on behavior in the UG is that rejection as a function 
of the share of the responder is weakly decreasing until the 50-50 split is reached, and weakly 
increasing for higher values. One important prediction that is common to all specifications of 
inequality averse preferences is that these are preference over outcomes, and hence are 
independent of what caused the outcomes. For example, if inequality aversion is what drives the 
choice of players in the UG, then the responder should always reject a low offer, even though the 
offer is decided by chance.   
3. A third approach, which I have widely discussed in the previous chapters, is to 
dispense with GT, uses a psychological, rather than rational choice, perspective and invokes 
negative emotions, such as frustration, as the ultimate cause of rejections.  
 
In this chapter I will provide results from experiments in which I used variations of the 
classical UG that are not consistent with any of the theories reviewed here, and suggest instead a 
different interpretation of behavior of subjects in these experimental games. I propose the 
following hypotheses:  
                                                                                                                                                  
(2) 
  
  max
  
, 0	   max
  
, 0	 
The second term in (1) or (2) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, while the third term 
measures the loss from advantageous inequality.”  
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1. Behavior in the UG is driven by cognitive factors that implement an abstract 
moral rule of equal splitting. When asked to split an endowment, or to accept or reject a proposed 
allocation, subjects are cued to use a moral rule about allocations. When there is no sufficient 
reason to deviate from equal split (because, for instance, there is no merit in being a proposer), 
then the default rule of equal splitting applies.  
2. This rule, as a moral rule, applies when intentions, not outcomes, are relevant. 
3. This rule applies in all situations and roles, because it is a moral rule rather than a 
preference. Thus, it can be extended to predict the behavior of players for whom the moral rule is 
relevant (for example, third parties called to decide for others).  
 
4.1.1 Experimental method 
The experiments have been carried out in a completely controlled environment, in which 
participants believed they were playing together with other participants who had different roles 
(proposers, third parties), when they were actually dealing with offers decided a priori by the 
experimenter, in the same fashion as in other psychological studies (Civai et al., 2010; Sanfey et 
al., 2003; van't Wout et al., 2006; Crockett et al., 2008). In these studies the participant knew that 
the final payoff reflected the proportion of money she had decided to accept. On this point, the 
instructions stated:  
 [...] For instance, if P offers for ten times 1 euro to you and 9 euros to A, and you 
always accept, you end up with 10 euros and A ends up with 90 euros, which, in percentage, will 
be 1 euro and 9 euros.  
Participants were eventually paid a fix amount of money, i.e. 10 euros. 
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4.2 Experiment 1: third party UG with an external proposer 
In this experiment, we administered a version of the UG in which a proposer (P) allocates 
10 euros between a responder (B) and a counterpart A. B could accept or reject the offer. P was 
not affected by B’s decision; instead A receives the money offered by P if B accepted. The 
participant in the experiment plays the role of the responder (B). To control for the self-
involvement, B was asked to play both for herself and on behalf of an unknown third party (B') 
(see figure 1), namely the participant that is playing as the responder in the next experimental 
session (see chapter two). The fact that an external person P decided the allocations made it 
plausible to present B with offers which are unfair but advantageous for her. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Experiment 1-Target manipulation. P makes offers to B on how to divide 10 euros between B 
and A. B decides whether to accept or reject these offers: accepting, the money is divided between B and 
A as P has decided, whereas rejecting, neither B nor A get anything. P is not affected by B’s decision, and 
rejections lose their role of punishment. In a second condition, B is asked to decide on behalf of B’: if B 
accepts P’s offers, the money is divided between B’ and A’ as P has decided, otherwise neither B’ nor A’ 
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get anything. B’ and A’ are two (anonymous) participants that are playing in the roles of B and A in the 
next experimental session. 
 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants.  
Twenty-eight healthy participants were tested (9 females), aged between 19 and 35. They 
were all paid the same fixed amount (10 euros), although in the beginning of the experiment they 
were told that their payoff would be dependent on their performance (see the paragraph 
“Overview on the experimental method”).  
Materials and procedure.  
The participant (B) is asked to accept or reject divisions of 10 euros between herself and 
another person A, who has no decisional power. Allocations are 9 (1:9, 2:8…9:1), and are made 
by an external proposer P (actually, they have already been established by the experimenter). 
Before starting the game, the participant reads the instructions sheet, in which she is told that 
three groups of participants takes part into the study: one group has played before as P, another is 
playing as A, and the last one plays as B, which is the group she has been randomly assigned to. 
The triplets A-B-P are randomly matched. The participant is told that P is a person that has 
already performed the task, and has received 6 euros for splitting several banknotes of 10 euros 
between two couples of players (A and B, A' and B'). The participant is also told that A is 
performing a memory task in another lab, and that she is completely unaware that her 
compensation depends on other persons' decisions. In this way, complete anonymity is 
guaranteed.  
 As in the previous studies described here, the participant is asked to accept or reject P's 
allocations also on behalf of an unknown third party, namely the next participant (B'); the 
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participant knows that B' is playing after her, and will decide on allocations made by another P 
between herself (B') and A', who is taking part to the same memory experiment as A does. 
Following the same rule, the participant knows that she and A have been the B' and A' for the 
previous couple of participants. The participant knows that the payoff is a percentage reflecting 
the proportion of money she decided to accept. She knows also that B' (and, consequently, A') is 
actually given the percentage accepted on her behalf, thus B' starts playing with an endowment. 
In the same way, participant's payoff depends also on what the previous B has decided on her 
behalf. 
In this setting, rejections lose their role of tools for punishing unfair intentions, since they 
do not affect the payoff of the potential unfair proposer (P). Moreover, participants can face 
unfair but advantageous divisions (e.g. 9 to B and 1 to A). Eventually, the self-involvement is 
controlled. 
We have investigated the effects of two factors, which are Target of the division (2 levels: 
Myself -MS- and third party -TP-) and Gain (9 levels: 1 to 9 euros out of 10), on the rejection 
rate (RR). Each offer was randomly presented eight times (four in MS -myself condition: 
participant plays for himself- and four in TP -third party condition: participant plays on behalf of 
B'-) for 5 seconds, as follows: “P offers 7 euros to you (or “to the next participant”), and 3 euros 
to A (or “A’”)”. After 3 seconds, participants had to respond to the question “Do you accept?” by 
button press. 
 
4.2.2 Results and discussion.  
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A repeated measures ANOVA (2X9) was performed, which shows a main effect of Gain 
(F (8, 208) = 26,965,  p < .001, ηp2 =.5): RR is higher for disadvantageous offers and decreases as 
the offers become more advantageous, independently of the fairness.  
Both the main effect of Target (F (1, 27) = 7,162, p < .05, ηp2 = .210) and the Target X 
Gain interaction (F (8, 216) = 1,998, p < .05, ηp2 = .06) were found to be significant: the RR is 
higher in TP for unfair advantageous offers with respect to MS (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). 
However, RR in TP1 and in TP2 is higher compared to, respectively, TP8 and TP9 (TP1-TP9: t 
(27) = 3,974, p < .001; t (27) = 3,101, p < .005). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Results of experiment 1 (RR).  The graph displays the mean percentage of offers rejected (y) 
for each gain (x). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (see Table 1). The significant 
main effect of Gain is given by the higher percentage of rejections for unfair disadvantageous gains 
(1,2,3) compared to fair (4,5,6) and unfair advantageous (7,8,9). The significant main effect of Target and 
the significant interaction TargetXGain are given by the higher percentage of rejections for TP8 and TP9 
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compared to MS8 and MS9. However, RR is higher for TP1 and TP2 compared to, respectively, TP8 and 
TP9.  
 
Table 4.1. Average RR for the disadvantageous (1+2+3+4), fair (5) and advantageous (6+7+8+9) offers, 
for MS and TP, respectively. 
RR DISADV FAIR ADV 
RR_MS (SEM) 36.38 (6.02) 2.68 (1.49) 8.26 (3.77) 
RR_TP (SEM) 39.95 (6.27) 8.93 (3.68) 21.87 (5.63) 
 
 If rejections are used as a tool to punish unfair intentions, they should not occur in any of 
the treatments in the present experiment, because B’s rejections are not affecting P’s payoff, 
hence punishment is not operating. The results show that rejections cannot be interpreted as 
punishment, because participants reject even if this decision affects the payoff of an “innocent” 
person, such as A, and do not punish the unfair person (P). Also the behavior of the responder 
acting for a third party cannot be interpreted by assuming that the subject takes on the 
preferences of the person she is deciding for. This result might be attributed to an in-group effect: 
it is possible that participants feel to be part of the group of the responders, given the fact that 
they know their payoffs are affected also by previous players' decisions, leading them to perceive 
the third party (B') as part of this group (Zamir, 2001; Civai et al., 2010).   
Let us now consider inequality aversion. What should one take the preferences of the 
responder to be? If the theorist is again free to choose the preferences that fit the data, then 
assuming that player B has inequality aversion with lower weights on own utility will predict a 
pattern of rejection that we have observed.  
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4.3 Experiment 2: the UG with allocators' manipulation 
In experiment 1 we have asked participants to accept or reject divisions of 10 euros 
between themselves and A, when these allocations were decided by an external proposer P. 
However, one can argue that, since intentions matter (e.g., Blount, 1995), the perceived 
unfairness of P might have triggered frustration, and hence rejections are a reaction to this 
frustration. In order to understand whether this is the case, in experiment 2 we have manipulated 
the allocator: now participants know that, in one condition, the division is made by P and, in a 
second condition, it is made by C, a random number generator, that gives the same probability to 
each outcome. C cannot be, by definition, unfair, since it does not have intentions. In addition to 
the predictions already discussed in experiment 1, here we also predict that, if rejections are 
triggered by P's intentional unfairness, they should disappear when the allocator is C. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Experiment 2- Allocator manipulation. B decides whether to accept or reject offers on how to 
divide 10 euros between him-/herself and A. Accepting, the money is divided between B and A as it has 
been established, whereas rejecting, neither B nor A get anything. In one condition, offers are made by P, 
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who is not affected by B’s decision; in a second condition, offers are made by C, a coin. In both 
conditions, rejections lose their role of punishment.  
 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants.  
Thirty healthy participants were tested (20 females), aged between 19 and 35. They were 
all paid the same fixed amount, i.e. 10 euros, although in the beginning of the experiment they 
were told that their payoff would be dependent on their performance.  
Materials and procedure.   
As in experiment 1, the participant (B) is asked to accept or reject divisions of 10 euros 
between herself and another person A, who does not play any role. Divisions’ options are 9 (1:9, 
2:8…9:1), and are made by either a third person P, who is not affected by B’s decisions, as in 
experiment one, or by a random number generator C, which, by definition, cannot be unfair 
(offers are actually always established a priori by the experimenter). To avoid overloading 
participants with information, we have ruled out the myself-third party manipulation, asking 
them to play just for themselves (See fig. 4.3).  
We have investigated the effect of two factors, Allocator (2 levels: P and C) and Gain (9 
levels: 1 to 9 euros out of 10), on the rejection rate (RR). Each offer is randomly presented eight 
times (four by P and four by C) for 5 seconds, as follows: “P offers/C allocates: 7 euros to you 
and 3 euros to A”. After 3 seconds, the participant has to respond to the question “Do you 
accept?” by button press.  
 
4.3.2 Results and discussion.  
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A repeated measures ANOVA (2X9) was performed, which shows a main effect of Gain 
(F (8, 232) = 27,01, p < .001, ηp2 = .482). RR is high for disadvantageous offers and decreases as 
the offers become more advantageous, independently of the fairness/equity. No effect of 
Allocator was found (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2) 
From the results of experiment 2, it can be concluded, once again, that rejections do not 
depend on the will to punish the source of inequality. People tend to reject unfair and 
disadvantageous partitions even if they are the result of a random division made by C, and not of 
an intentional act of unfairness. And, again, inequality is not always rejected; in fact, it is 
accepted when it is advantageous for the responder’s payoff.  These results are apparently in 
contrast with the idea that intentions associated with human actions matters: we will discuss our 
interpretation in the General Discussion paragraph. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Results of experiment 2 (RR). The graph displays the mean percentage of offers rejected (y) 
for each gain (x). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (see table 4.2). The significant 
main effect of Gain is given by the higher percentage of rejections for unfair disadvantageous gains 
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(1,2,3) compared to fair (4,5,6) and unfair advantageous (7,8,9). No significant difference between the 
two allocators is found. 
 
Table 4.2. Average Rejection’s Rate (RR) for the disadvantageous (1+2+3+4), fair (5) and advantageous 
(6+7+8+9) offers, for P and C, respectively. 
RR DISADV FAIR ADV 
RR_P (SEM) 36.66 (6.66) 5.83 (3.1) 7.08 (3.27) 
RR_C (SEM) 38.96 (6.71) 9.16 (4.23) 7.29 (2.78) 
 
 
4.4 Experiment 3: third-party UG with coin's allocations 
In this next experiment, we kept the random number generator C as the allocator. We 
carried out this third experiment because we aimed at clarifying the third party behavior, namely 
the behavior of participants when playing on behalf of the third party. We have ruled out the 
potential in-group bias by telling the participant that she has to accept or reject the division 
between two unknown persons (D and E), who are participating to another experiment, as A 
does. In this way, the participant is not required to decide on behalf of the next responder, who, 
as discussed above, might be considered part of the participant's group. In addition to rejection 
rate, we have also collected fairness ratings, on a 12-point Likert scale ranging from “very fair” 
to “very unfair”. We predict that, if participants are endowed with a preference for fairness, they 
will reject all the unequal splits when the payoffs of D and E are involved, whereas they will 
reject only unequal split which are disadvantageous for themselves when their own payoff is 
involved, since in this case the selfish preference for a relative higher payoff may overcome the 
fairness preference.  
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Figure 4.5. Experiment 3-Target manipulation. C randomly establishes how to divide 10 euros between B 
and A. B decides whether to accept or reject these offers: accepting, the money is divided between B and 
A as C has established, whereas rejecting, neither B nor A get anything. Rejections lose their role of 
punishment. In a second condition, B is asked to decide whether to accept or reject divisions between D 
and E, who are two subjects completely uninvolved in the experimental protocol.  
 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants.  
Forty-one right-handed healthy participants were tested (25 females), aged between 19 and 
35. They were all paid the same fixed amount, although in the beginning of the experiment they 
were told that their payoff would depended on their performance.  
Materials and procedure.  
As in experiments 1 and 2, the participant (B) is asked to accept or reject divisions of 10 
euros between himself and another person A, who does not play any role. Divisions’ options are 
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9 (1:9, 2:8…9:1), and are made by a random number generator C. The participant is also asked to 
decide on allocations between two third parties, not involved in the game; she is told that D and 
E (See fig. 4.5) take part into another experimental protocol, in which they are administered a 
memory task, and both of them are totally unaware of the way in which their payoffs will be 
decided, as A is. 
We have investigated the effect of two factors, Target (2 levels: MS and TP) and Gain (9 
levels: 1 to 9 euros out of 10) on the rejection rate (RR), while on fairness ratings the factors 
Target (2 levels: MS and TP) and Fairness (5 levels: unfair_advantageous, mid-
value_advantageous, fair, mid-value disadvantageous, unfair_disadvantageous) are considered.  
Each offer is randomly presented eight times (four in MS and four in TP). The participant 
sees on the screen one couple of targets (“A, YOU” or “D, E”) (see fig. 4.6) for 5 seconds; after 
one second of blank screen, it appears the allocation (e.g. 3-7). The participant knows that the 
number on the left refers to the target previously presented on the left, and vice-versa. As soon as 
she sees the allocation, she has to respond by button press.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Experimental procedure. Participants saw the targets of the division (A, You / D, E) for 5 
seconds on the screen. The position of each target is counterbalanced among the offers (e.g. for 3-7 
7€3€ resp1 sec
A YOU 3 sec
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division, which is repeated 4 times in MS, “You” appears twice on the left and twice on the right). After 
one second of blank screen, the division is diplayed: participants know that, in this case, 3 refers to A’s 
payoff and 7 refers to their payoff. As soon as the allocation appears on the screen, participants have to 
respond “yes” or “no” by button press. Response button are counterbalanced among participants. 
 
4.4.2 Results and discussion.  
The ANOVA on RR shows a significant main effect of Gain (F (8, 320) = 47,23,  p < 
.001, ηp2  = .541), a significant main effect of Target (Target: F (1,40) = 12,60, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.240) and a significant TargetXGain interaction (F (8,320) = 19,345, p < .001, ηp2  = .326). In 
MS, as in the previous two experiments, RR is high for disadvantageous offers and decreases as 
the offers become more advantageous, independently of the equity; in TP, on the other hand, RR 
is higher for extremely unequal than for equal divisions (Figure 4.7). In contrast with experiment 
one, no significant difference was found for TP1-TP9 or TP2-TP8. 
A repeated-measure ANOVA (2X5) was performed also on fairness ratings: it shows a 
main effect of Fairness (F (4,156) = 99,906, p < .001, ηp2 = .719) and a significant interaction 
TargetXFairness (F (4,156) = 3,874, p < .01, ηp2 = .09). The interesting result is the interaction; 
although MS unfair offers, both advantageous and disadvantageous, are still considered to be 
actually unfair, a t-test for paired samples shows that participants considered MS 
unfair_advantageous offers significantly fairer than TP unfair offers (t (1,40) = -2,599, p < .05). 
From the results of experiment three, it can be concluded, once again, that rejections are not 
necessarily a punishing act, and that inequality is not always rejected; in fact, it is accepted when 
it is advantageous for the responder’s payoff. However, when deciding for third parties, free from 
potential in-group biases, participant has no reason to accept an unequal division, therefore 
inequality is generally rejected. 
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Figure 4.7. Results of experiment 3 (RR).  The graph displays the mean percentage of offers rejected (y) 
for each gain (x). The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (see table 4.3). The significant 
main effect of Gain is given by the higher percentage of rejections for unfair disadvantageous gains 
(1,2,3) compared to fair (4,5,6) and unfair advantageous (7,8,9) in MS. The significant effect of Target 
and the significant interaction TargetXGain is driven by the higher percentage of rejected offers for unfair 
advantageous gains in TP than in MS. The difference between the extremely unfair offers (1, 2, 3 and 7, 8, 
9) in TP is not significant. 
 
Table 4.3 Average Rejection’s Rate (RR) for the disadvantageous/unfair (1+2+3+4), fair (5) and 
advantageous/unfair (6+7+8+9) offers, for MS and TP, respectively. 
RR DISADV/UNF FAIR ADV/UNF 
RR_MS (SEM) 50.23 (5.88) 1.68 (1.21) 11.58 (3.87) 
RR_TP (SEM) 41.92 (5.15) 9.45 (2.87) 40.62 (5.32) 
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4.5 General discussion 
The traditional UG involves two players: the proposer, who makes offers on how to split an 
amount of money, and the responder, who accepts or rejects these offers. If the responder 
accepts, the money is divided as the proposer has decided, otherwise they both get nothing. 
Against predictions of self-interest made by classical economic theories, the proposer tends to 
make fair offers and the responder tends to reject offers that are considered unfair. The most 
accredited accounts that explain this apparently irrational behavior involve the concept of social 
preferences: individuals do not only care about their own payoff, but also about others' payoffs. 
In this view, rejections are seen both as a reaction to an unequal disliked outcome (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and as a punishment towards an unfair proposer (Rabin, 
1993; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). The wounded pride/spite model (Pillutla & Murnigham, 1996) 
recognizes in negative emotions, such as anger and frustration, the psychological cause of 
rejections: fairness norms are violated, anger and frustration are elicited by the violation, and 
individuals are driven to rejecting money irrationally in order to punish this violation.  
However, the traditional UG has some limitations that do not allow understanding the roles 
of neither reciprocity, nor inequality aversion, nor negative emotions, in cause of the fact that a) 
rejections always lead to punish the source of unfairness, b) responders seldom face unfair but 
advantageous offers, and c) responders' payoff is heavily involved.  
In the experiments described above, we have manipulated three variables (the involvement 
of the proposer, the advantage of the offers and the involvement of the self) in order to clarify 
what influences choices in this bargaining game. 
 
4.5.1 Negative reciprocity 
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A robust and crucial result is that negative reciprocity does not seem to be the solely cause 
of the rejections, thus leading to reject our second hypothesis; our responders rejected offers even 
if it did not mean to punish unfair behavior, and this occurred both when responders believed the 
allocator was an external, non-involved proposer, and when they believed the allocation was set 
by a random number generator. This finding seems to contrast theories of reciprocity, which 
claim that rejections are driven by the desire to punish the bad intentions of the proposer. 
However, there are a few points that differentiate the current study from the previous ones. First 
of all, I will consider the case of the reduced UG (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003; Güroğlu, 
van den Bos, Rombouts, and Crone, 2008). In this version of the game, proposers have to divide 10 
dollars, and have to choose between two alternatives: in condition a), one alternative is fair (5/5) 
and the other is unfair (8/2 for the proposer); in condition b), one alternative is unfair (8/2 for the 
proposer) and the other is hyper-unfair (10/0 for the proposer). In a), responders reject the unfair 
offer, while in b) they accept it, even though it is exactly the same offer. This result is considered 
to be a proof of the importance of the proposers' intentions over the simple consideration of the 
outcome. However, whereas in this study responder's attention is focused on the proposer's 
intentions, giving her different choices, in the current experiments participants were not focused 
on the intentions: in fact, they just could not attribute any kind of responsibility, and this might 
have ruled out any kind of considerations of good or bad intentions from the decisional process.  
Secondly, I am considering the study of Blount (1995). Here, the author found that when 
the allocations were decided by a random number generator, people tend to state lower MAO, 
compared to the condition in which the division was set by the proposer. I account this difference 
to the different requirements of the task. In Blount's experiment, participants were first asked to 
predict a distribution of offers, and then to decide a MAO; requiring participants to focus on the 
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distribution, which, in the random condition, was expected to be flat and to place equal 
probabilities across all possible outcomes, might have influenced the subsequent responses by 
driving participants to make MAOs more consistent with the idea of the random distribution. 
However, still the mean MAO is 1.20 $, indicating that offers which are considered too low 
would be rejected anyway. In our task, participants are directly asked to accept or reject the 
offers, and so they do not have the chance to focus on what they would rationally expect from the 
game. This leaves participants to be more instinctive in their choices, and free from expectations 
biases (Sanfey, 2009). Moreover, in Blount’s study, there is no difference between the condition 
in which the allocation is decided by the involved proposer and the condition in which it is 
decided by an external proposer. Even if intentions are still considered, reciprocity should not be 
accounted for this result; as Blount noted, responders can be motivated either by a desire to 
manifest their disappointment and exit the game if the procedure produces unfair results or by 
desiring to punish the proposer who behaved unfairly.  We are not claiming here that the negative 
reciprocity does not play any role in this interaction: in fact, it might be that it is the main reason 
to reject unfair offers made by an involved proposer (traditional UG). However, since people 
reject also when negative reciprocity cannot be accounted for the rejections, it means that there 
are different factors involved. Though we cannot say if in the traditional UG prevails one or the 
other motive, or if they coexist, we can claim that, given our results, the desire to refuse general 
unfairness, beyond punishment, exists and plays a crucial role under certain environmental 
conditions.  
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4.5.2 Inequality aversion. 
What few studies, to my knowledge, have focused on is the maximum acceptable offer that 
responders are willing to accept (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993). There are studies on social values 
orientation that divides people into three categories, which are prosocials, individualists and 
competitors, depending on which aspect of the division the person cares about. Prosocials are 
interested in increasing their payoff together with the payoff of the counterpart, trying to 
minimize the discrepancies; individualists care only about maximizing their own gain; 
competitors seek, in contrast to prosocials, to maximize discrepancies between relative payoffs 
(Van Lange, 1999; Haruno & Frith, 2010). These studies used the Ring Measure of Social Value 
to assign people to one of these three categories (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, and Suhre, 1986): in 
this paradigm, the person distributes hypothetical amounts of money between himself and 
another person, choosing the distribution between two alternatives. However, there are 
limitations to this task that should be considered: first of all, the money is hypothetical, and, in 
van Lange’s study, participants knew since the beginning that their payoff was not influenced by 
their performance, thus limiting the expression of the social preference to a hypothetical context; 
secondly, the reputation effects are not controlled, and it is known that these are variables that 
can influence dramatically the behavior, as it is demonstrated in Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and 
Smith (1994) and in Dana, Kuang, and Weber, (2007). In conclusion, both the limit of 
hypothetical scenario and the reputation-seeking effects can induce the participants to show a 
prosocial behavior that actually depends on self-interested motivations concerning reputation.   
In my studies, I have ruled out the reputation effects by guaranteeing the total anonymity; I 
have used a modified UG, giving the responders the opportunity to accept or reject unfair but 
advantageous offers, finding out that they were willing to accept them, even if they still 
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considered them to be unfair, as demonstrated by fairness ratings results in experiment three. For 
this reason, I question the account that considers the rejections to be caused by a taste for fairness 
and an aversion for unequal payoff. One of the most accredited accounts that describe inequality-
aversion is the one put forward by Fehr and Schmidt (1999): as mentioned in the introduction, 
the authors predict that a responder is inequality averse, but with a preference for accepting 
unequal outcomes that favor her own payoff. The results presented here for the ms condition 
would actually confirm their theory of inequality aversion: responders reject unfair offers, but 
accept as the offers become advantageous for themselves. However, I am skeptical in 
considering this as an evidence of social preference for fairness: if a preference for fair outcomes 
implies the rejection of disadvantageous unfair outcome but the acceptance of advantageous 
unfair outcomes, it actually turns to be a preference for being better off the other player. Fehr and 
Schmidt consider two parameters, one representing the degree of fairness concerns and the other 
one representing the envy, and they are actually able to explain most of the behavioral evidences 
varying these parameters; however, as Bicchieri and Zhang (2008) have point out, they do not 
specify how these parameters should vary, and which are the circumstances that might explain 
the variance. 
As far as the third party condition is concerned, the theories of inequality aversion make no 
specific prediction: in fact, Fehr and Schmidt say “inequity aversion is self-centered if people do 
not care per se about inequity that exists among other people, but are only interested in the 
fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 
p.819). On the contrary, my results show that people seem to care about inequality that exists 
among other people, reflecting a preference for fair outcomes, as demonstrated by the fact that 
unfair outcomes in tp are rejected. Therefore, it could be argued that people are endowed with 
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fairness concerns, which turn into more selfish self-advantage considerations when their own 
payoff is at stake. 
 
4.5.3 Self-involvement 
In experiments 1 and 3, as well as in the studies reported in chapters 2 and 3, I have 
manipulated the degree of personal involvement of the responder. This was necessary in order to 
understand whether rejections are driven by an irrational reaction to a personal attack, or by a 
more “cognitive” moral aversion to fairness' norm's violation. The results presented here showed 
that the degree of self-involvement plays a crucial role: when the responder's payoff is at stake, a 
more competitive behavior overcomes fairness concerns, which are taken into account, in 
contrast, when participants play on behalf of third parties. In support to this interpretation, I have 
found a difference in the rejection rate by manipulating the degree of closeness of the third party 
involved: in experiment 1, when the third party is depicted as the next responder and thus 
considered as part of the participant's group, the rejection rate for (unfair) offers which are 
advantageous for the third party is lower than the rejection rate for (unfair) disadvantageous 
offers, while we have seen no difference for rejection rate in the uncorrelated third party 
condition (experiment 3), in which participants accepted only fair offers. This can be explained 
in terms of favoritism: responders tend to favor themselves and their group members, whereas 
when there is no involvement, and no reason to favor one person over the other, they are 
inequality-averse. This observation might sound trivial, but actually self-involvement is 
something that has always been neglected when considering social preferences. This happens 
because, classically, self-involvement is an integral part of the game; however, theories on social 
preferences should take into account the strength of this variable, and consider that basic 
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behavioral principles might change just according to the level of involvement. This is a 
phenomenon that can be experienced every day: for instance, we know that we are very good in 
judging people as far as we, or our closest ones, are not those people.  
In light of these results, I propose an account in which three principles are considered to 
explain responder's behavior: maximization of the payoff (rationality), competitiveness (self-
oriented fairness) and pure fairness preference. When the responder is personally involved in the 
bargain, the three principles vie to the response; when she is not personally involved, rationality 
principle and fairness are competing for the response. Therefore, I am concluding that deciding 
on monetary outcomes depends on preferences associated with the material payoff; however, 
preferences vary with contextual cues, such as the self-involvement, which determines a shift of 
tolerance for unequal outcome towards self-advantage. Social preferences are not stable; 
theoretical accounts that consider environmental changes as predictors of behavior are the best 
candidates to explain behavioral dynamics that take place in social games. (Dana et al., 2007; 
Bicchieri & Zhang, 2008; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2008; Hertwig & Herzog, 2009). Gneezy and 
Rustichini, for example, found that participants who were rewarded with a monetary 
compensation for their performance in a cognitive task performed less successfully as compared 
to participants who were just driven by the intrinsic motivation, which is in itself rewarding 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000); this means that the utility is not always to be considered as the 
monetary reward, but, depending on the situation, it might take different shapes. 
In this study, we have shed light on different aspects of social interaction in bargaining 
games, showing that the principles that drive the behavior might change together with self-
involvement. We have seen that pure inequality-aversion and fairness concerns are leading 
behavior when the participants are not directly involved, whereas maximizing the differences 
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between payoffs seems to be the major concern when participants' own payoff is at stake. These 
findings support the account according to which behavioral responses are guided by social 
strategies that are, in turn, triggered by environmental changes. This assumption is plausible if it 
is considered that our cognitive system seems to be accustomed to strategies. to take an example 
from cognitive neuroscience, it has recently been shown that, in contrast to one of the main 
assumptions of embodied cognition theories, the motor system is not necessarily required in 
order to understand motor-related language and that its recruitment  is just strategic (Tomasino, 
Werner, Weiss, and Gereon R. Fink, 2007; Tomasino, Fink, Sparing, Dafotakis, and Weiss 2008; 
Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, and Rumiati, 2009;  Papeo, Corradi-Dell'acqua, and Rumiati, 2011). If the 
context does not allow this recruitment (e.g., lesions, interferences), other paths are chosen in 
order to achieve the task.  
Further work is needed; in particular, also in light of results presented in chapter 3, we 
hypothesize that the self-centered inequality aversion might be grounded in self-related and 
emotion-related areas, such as the medial prefrontal cortex whereas the pure fairness concerns 
might have their neural correlates in areas associated to morality and norm compliance, such as 
anterior insula. 
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Chapter 5 
The neural basis of inequality as an abstract social 
rule. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter three, I have discussed the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) 
and the anterior insula (AI) in UG rejections; MPFC was involved in rejecting unfair offers 
which addressed the self (MS condition), whereas AI in rejecting unfair offers that addressed 
both the self and the third party (TP condition). The data suggest that this middle-anterior MPFC 
activity might be related to emotional arousal evoked by an unfair offer related to the self, while 
AI seems an ideal candidate for mediating fairness-related behavior which emerges from the 
integration of cognitive, emotional and motivational mechanisms. However, it is still unclear 
whether the fairness-related behavior reflects a moral act, motivated by the wish of sanctioning 
an intentional unfair action, or inequity aversion, motivated by the wish of preventing an unfair 
division from taking place, irrespectively of its moral salience. Moreover, it has also to be 
clarified whether MPFC and AI respond to unfairness itself or to unfairness which is 
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disadvantageous for the responder; in fact, the fMRI study described in chapter 3, even though 
with the introduction of the TP condition made it possible to dissociate general unfairness from 
unfairness directed to the self, does not really allow to disentangle between norm compliance and 
empathy in the TP condition, given the possible identification of the responder with the next 
responder (in-group effect). 
In the last chapter, I have described data supporting the idea that pure inequity-aversion 
and fairness concerns are leading behavior when the participants are not directly involved, 
whereas maximizing the differences between payoffs seems to be the major concern when 
participants' own payoff is at stake. Moreover, I have found no difference in the rejection rate 
between a human non-involved proposer and a partition algorithm (see experiment 2, chapter 4). 
This means that, first of all, even though bad intention may amplify the reaction to unfairness, 
subjects are sensitive to inequity. Secondly, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicted, inequity-
aversion is actually self-centered, since responders are more averse to proposals that favor the 
opponent, and more prone to accept divisions that favor themselves. This is true when the self is 
involved, while it is not the case in the TP condition, when a completely unrelated third party is 
involved: in this situation, the default mode is rejecting unfairness, when there is no good 
motivation to accept it, such as merit or need (e.g. Camerer & Thaler, 1995).  
In order to contribute to the comprehension of the brain mechanisms underlying this 
complex behavior, I have carried out an fMRI study in which subjects, while lying in the scanner, 
played as responders in a task which was very similar to the one described in the third 
experiment of chapter 4: participants had to accept or reject divisions made by an algorithm, both 
between themselves and an uninvolved opponent A, and between two unrelated third parties, E 
and D. The hypothesis is that the self-centered inequity aversion might be grounded in the 
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emotional system, whereas the pure fairness concerns might have their neural correlates in areas 
associated to morality and norm compliance. I expect a major activation in the MPFC during 
unfairness in the MS condition with respect to the TP condition, especially for disadvantageous 
unfairness; consequently, I expect also a major activation when rejecting unfair offers, as 
opposed to acceptance, in MS, but not in TP. Also, AI is expected to be involved in facing 
unfairness, irrespectively of whether this is advantageous or disadvantageous, or self- or other-
directed.  
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Nineteen (12 females) subjects took part in the experiment. None of the participants had 
any history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
subjects, who were naive to the purpose of the experiment. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee. 
 
5.2.2 Task and Stimuli 
Task, stimuli and experimental set-up were similar to those used in experiment three as 
described in chapter 4. 
To sum up briefly, the random number generator C is kept as the allocator. The potential in-
group bias has been ruled out by telling the participant that she has to accept or reject the 
division between two unknown persons (D and E), who are participating to another experiment, 
as A does. In this way, the participant is not required to decide on behalf of the next responder, 
who, as discussed above, might be considered part of the participant's group. As in the previous 
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experiment, I predict that, if participants are endowed with a preference for fairness, they will 
reject all the unequal splits when the payoffs of D and E are involved, whereas they will reject 
only unequal split which are disadvantageous for themselves when their own payoff is involved, 
since in this case the selfish preference for a relative higher payoff may overcome the fairness 
preference (see figure 4. 5, chapter 4, for the structure of the task). In this experiment, I have re-
introduced the Free Win (FW) task, in which participants have to accept or reject money 
provided by the computer that is not resulting from a partition, in order to control for pure 
monetary gain cleaned from fairness effects. As opposed to both the physiological study 
described in chapter 2 and imaging study in chapter 3, this time the FW task refers only to the 
myself condition, not to the third party condition. 
I have investigated the effect of two factors, TASK (3 levels: UG_MS, UG_TP and 
FW) and GAIN (5 levels), on both the behavior and the brain activity. Division options 
were 9 (1:9, 2:8….8:2, 9:1), repeated 4 times each except from 5:5, which was repeated 8 
times; divisions were consequently collapsed in hyper_disadvantageous –h_dis- (1:9, 
2:8), mid_disadvantageous –m_dis- (3:7, 4:6), hyper_advantageous –h_adv- (9:1, 8:2), 
mid_advantageous –m_adv- (7:3, 6:4) and fair –for this, the factor GAIN has 5 levels-. 
For FW, the offers range from 1 to 9 (for an example of both UG and FW trials, see 
figure 5.1, A and B respectively). It is necessary to stress that this terminology is suitable 
for the myself condition, in which there is actually a clear advantage or disadvantage for 
the subject, whereas it is not properly used for the third party condition, where it would 
be better to consider the offers as two groups of hyper_unfair –h_unf- and two groups of 
mid_unfair (one group favors C and the other favors D), as the subject is getting 
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advantage (or disadvantage) from none of them. Also, as far as the FW is concerned, 
terms related to fairness have no real meaning: in this task no fairness should be involved, 
since no comparison is going on. For simplicity, I will refer to h_dis, mid_dis, mid_adv, 
h_adv and fair_ms when referring to UG_MS and when describing the model in general, 
and to h_unf, mid_unf and fair_tp when referring to UG_TP. 
 
 A 
 B 
Figure 5.1. (A) An example of one UG_MS trial: it lasted 3 seconds on the screen, and the participant 
had to respond by button press as soon as the offer appeared on the screen. The position of the targets “A” 
and “YOU” was counterbalanced among trials, in order to rule out potential effects given by attention, 
compatibility or number line. The same structure applies for UG_TP trials, with D and E instead of A and 
YOU. (B) An example of one FW trial: also in this case, the position of the target was counterbalanced 
among trials. 
A 
3 EU 
YOU 
7 EU 
 
YOU 
2 EU 
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5.2.3 fMRI data acquisition and experimental set-up 
Images were acquired using a 3-T MRI scanner (Achieva 3.0T Philips Medical 
Systems, Netherlands) equipped with a standard quadrature head coil and for echo-planar 
(EPI). Head movement was minimized by mild restraint and cushioning. Thirty-four 
slices of functional MR images were acquired using blood oxygenation level-dependent 
(3.59 x 3.59 mm, 4 mm thick, repetition time = 2 s, time echo = 35 ms; flip angle: 90; 
field of view, FOV: 23 x 23 cm, acquisition matrix: 64x64; SENSE factors: 2 in anterior-
posterior direction), covering the entire cortex. At the beginning of the scanning session, 
anatomical scans were also acquired for each participant (TR/TE: 8.2/3.7, 190 transverse 
axial slices; flip angle: 8; 1 mm3 voxel size; FOV=24 cm x 24 cm; acquisition matrix: 
240×240; no SENSE factors).  
Participants lay supine in the MR scanner with their head fixated by firm foam pads 
for approximately 40 minutes (7 minutes required for the anatomical scans and about 32 
minutes for the task). The experimental task was presented using the Presentation 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.), and delivered within the scanner by means of 
MR-compatible goggles mounted on the coil. For each experimental trial, participants 
were first presented with the monetary offer for 3000 msec, to which they had to respond 
the faster they could by button press; trials were followed by an inter-trial interval 
ranging from 3000 msec to 7000 msec with an incremental step of 33 msec. Each 
experimental session comprised 120 randomized trials [3 TASK x 5 GAIN x 8 
repetitions] and 1 minute of low level baseline, as 20 seconds of fixation cross at the 
beginning, in the middle and at the end of each run. 
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5.2.4 Behavioral and imaging data processing 
For each subject, and for each condition, the rejection rate was calculated across all 8 
repetitions, and used in a TASK X GAIN Repeated Measures ANOVA. Statistical analysis was 
performed using SPSS 11.5 Software (SPSS Inc., Chertsey UK). 
Image processing and statistical analysis were performed using the SPM8 software 
package (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each participant we acquired 1030 
volumes (515 volumes for each fMRI-run); the first 5 volumes were discarded for each 
run to allow the magnetization reach steady state. Slice-acquisition delays were corrected 
using the middle slice as reference. All images were corrected for head movements. All 
images were then normalized to the standard SPM8 EPI template and spatially smoothed 
using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian filter. The high-pass filter was set to the cut-off value of 
128 s.  
Data were then fed into a first level analysis (GAIN model) using the general linear model 
framework (Kiebel and Holmes, 2004) implemented in SPM8. On the first level, for each 
individual subject, I fitted a linear regression model to the data. A factorial design 3 (TASK: 
UG_MS, UG_TP, FW) x 5 (GAIN: h_dis, m_dis, fair, m_adv and h_unf) yielded to 15 
conditions. These 15 vectors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function; 
to account for movement-related variance, we included six differential realignment parameters as 
regressors. The first level analysis of each subject yielded images describing the parameter 
estimates associated with each of the vectors modeled. These images were then fed into a 
second-level full factorial design with a within-subject factor of 15 levels using a random effects 
analysis (Penny and Holmes, 2004).  
 
100 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Behavioral results 
Overall, rejection rate is smaller with respect to the previous experiments presented, 
especially as far as MS condition is concerned; in fact, 6 subjects over 19 did not reject at 
all, other 3 subjects never rejected in MS, and one subject never rejected in TP. For each 
of the 19 subjects and for each condition, the rejection rates were calculated across all 8 
repetitions, and used in a 3 TASK x 5 GAIN Repeated Measures ANOVA. Results 
indicate a significant main effect of TASK (F(2, 36) = 16.101, p < 0.001, part. eta 
squared=.472), with the UG_TP  leading to a larger number of rejections than the 
UG_MS and the FW, as well as a main effect of GAIN (F(4,72) = 11.761, p < 0.001, part. 
eta squared=.395), with unfair offers being rejected more often than fair offers. These 
effects are driven by a TASK * GAIN interaction, which is also significant (F(8,144) = 
4.189, p < 0.001, part. eta squared=.189), suggesting that unfair offers in TP  are rejected 
significantly more often than h_adv (t(18)=-3.92, p<.001), but not than h_dis (t(18)=-
1.72), offers in UG_MS (see Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2. Behavioral Results. Rejection Rates are plotted as a function of Gain (Equity level) in 
UG_MS, UG_TP and FW. The error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM) (see table 5.1) 
 
Table 5.1. The table reports the average RR and the standard errors of the mean (SEM) for h_dis, mid_dis, 
fair, mid_adv, h_adv (columns), and for MS, TP and FW (raws). 
RR h_dis mid_dis fair mid_adv h_adv 
RR_MS (SEM) 24.70 (7.48) 9.21 (3.77) 0 2.67 (1.47) 6.58 (4.12) 
RR_TP (SEM) 38.79 (8.57) 21.84 (4.74) 5.59 (1.03) 15.61 (3.70) 38.15 (4.74) 
RR_FW (SEM) 16.11 (7.59) 6.38 (1.63) 0.65 (0.65) 0.75 (0.75) 1 (0.55) 
 
3.3.2 Neural Activations 
Unless stated otherwise, we report exclusively areas of activation which survived 
threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level, using FWE, with an 
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underlying height threshold of t > 3.12 (= cluster size estimate to p < 0.001, uncorrected) (Table 
5.1).  
 
Table 5.2. Voxels showing significant increases of neural activity associated with main effects and 
interactions. All clusters survived a threshold corresponding to p < 0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons across the whole brain, with an underlying height threshold corresponding to p < 0.001 
(uncorrected). Only contrasts yielding significant activations are reported. 
REGION SIDE MNI COORDINATES Z-value kE 
Main effect of TASK:  
UG_MS > UG_TP 
 x y z   
Middle temporal gyrus L -56 -50 6 4.53 672 
Superior temporal gyrus L -66 -46 12 3.70  
Main effect of UNFAIRNESS: 
Unf>Fair 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 36 24 -8 5.66 933 
Cingulate cortex L -4 18 46 5.05 1454 
Anterior cingulate cortex R 6 30 24 4.10  
Anterior cingulate cortex L -4 28 26 3.82  
103 
 
Inferior frontal gyrus L -44 4 30 4.46 330 
Anterior Insula L -38 14 4 4.45 537 
Simple main effect of UNFAIRNESS: 
UG_MS_unf>UG_MS_fair 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 34 22 -14 4.83 661 
Medial frontal gyrus R 8 22 50 4.09 581 
Superior frontal gyrus R 12 26 60 3.95  
Anterior cingulate cortex L -8 24 32 3.26  
Inferior frontal gyrus L -34 16 -10 3.78 255 
Anterior Insula L -32 20 8 3.46  
Simple main effect of UNFAIRNESS: 
UG_TP_unf>UG_TP_fair 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 34 26 -2 4.67 206 
Interaction: 
UG_MS (h_dis + mid_dis)- [UG_MS(h_adv+mid_adv)+UG_TP(h_unf+mid_unf)] 
Superior frontal gyrus R 14 52 40 4.76 797 
Superior frontal gyrus L -8 56 40 4.11  
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Main effects. I first tested for increases of neural activation associated with offers 
addressing oneself as opposed to offers addressing a third-party, in the UG [i.e., UG_MS– 
UG_TP]; such increase was found significant in the posterior superior and middle temporal 
gyrus. No suprathreshold voxel was found for the opposite contrast. Then, I looked for 
activations related to the unfair offers, as opposed to fair, across targets, i.e. UG_MS [(h_ dis+ 
mid_dis+h_adv+mid_adv)-fair] + UG_TP[(h_unf+ mid_unf)-fair]; a significant increase of 
BOLD signal was found in the left and the right AI and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) extending more ventrally and more anteriorly in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), bilaterally. No suprathreshold voxel was found for the opposite 
contrast. From the analysis of the two simple main effects of unfairness, considering separately 
UG_MS from UG_TP, it emerged that the activation in the MPFC was limited to UG_MS, 
whereas the AI was activated in both tasks. As shown in the signal plots, both left and right AI 
and MPFC clearly showed a U-shaped modulation as a function of the level of unfairness; for 
this reason, quadratic contrasts were performed on UG_MS, UG_TP and FW, assigning different 
Medial frontal gyrus R 10 42 40 3.64  
Supramarginal gyrus L -56 -68 30 4.03 598 
Middle temporal gyrus L -54 -52 4 3.88  
Inferior parietal lobe R 54 -60 38 3.90 384 
Superior temporal gyrus R 52 -60 28 3.87  
105 
 
weights to the different levels of fairness, i.e. [2 1 -6 1 2]. A cluster involving inferior frontal 
gyrus and anterior insula bilaterally was significantly active for both the UG_MS and in the 
UG_TP conditions, although the cluster in the latter condition was smaller than the cluster in the 
former (see figure 5.4, red and green blobs for, respectively, MS and TP, and graph), whereas a 
cluster extending from the dorsal to the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, over and around the 
anterior cingulate cortex (figure 5.4 and figure 5.5, red blobs) was active specifically for 
UG_MS. As expected, no suprathreshold voxel was found for the quadratic contrast in FW. 
Interactions. A main effect of task (UG_MS>UG_TP) and a main effect of fairness 
(unf>fair) were found; in order to understand whether there were areas which were specifically 
activated by unfair offers, as opposed to fair, in UG_MS, but not in UG_TP, I performed a 
contrast which tested for the interaction between task and fairness, i.e. UG_MS [(h_ dis+ 
mid_dis+h_adv+mid_adv)-fair] – UG_TP [(h_unf+ mid_unf)-fair]. No significant activation was 
found for our specific cluster level correction criterion; however, when cluster size was estimated 
at p=0.005, (instead of p=0.001) a portion of the MPFC showed a significant activation. As 
shown in the signal plots, the trend of the activation was higher for the disadvantageous as 
opposed to the advantageous offers in MS. Thus, in order to investigate the peculiarities of brain 
activations in relation to disadvantageous offers, this condition was contrasted with all the other 
unfair offers, both in UG_MS and in UG_TP. As expected, the contrast UG_MS (h_dis + 
mid_dis)- [UG_MS(h_adv+mid_adv)+UG_TP(h_unf+mid_unf)] showed an activation in the 
same cluster of the MPFC ([14 52 40), kE=797), meaning that this area is more sensitive to the 
unfairness when it is self-disadvantageous as opposed to self-advantageous or other-affecting 
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unfairness (see figure 5.5, blue blobs and graph). 4 No significant suprathreshold voxel was 
found for the opposite subtraction. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. In the upper part, the activation for the main effect of unfairness (unf>fair) is depicted. The 
red blobs indicate the activation for the UG_MS (MPFC+AI/IFG), the green blobs the activation for 
UG_TP (AI/IFG). In the lower part of the figure, the graph on the left (x=fairness level; y=beta-values; 
red bars=MS; green bars=TP; blue bars=FW; error bars=SEM) shows the activation in AI/IFG [36 24 -8]; 
a clear U-shape trend is recognizable for UG_MS and UG_TP, confirmed by the quadratic contrasts, 
while there is no effect for FW. The graph on the right shows the activation of the MPFC [8 22 50], which 
                                              
4
 Considering only UG_MS, the same area was found significantly activated for disadvantageous, as opposed to 
advantageous offers, even though it survived a threshold of 0.005 instead of 0.001. 
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is visible on the coronal section (red blobs), and in figure 5.5; in this case, the parametrical modulation of 
fairness level (U-shape) is significant for UG_MS, but neither for UG_TP nor for FW. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 In the upper part, the activation for the interaction UG_MS (h_dis + mid_dis)- 
[UG_MS(h_adv+mid_adv)+UG_TP(h_unf+mid_unf)] is depicted in blue. In order to give a 
comparison term, the red blobs indicate the activation for the UG_MS (MPFC+AI/IFG). In the lower part 
of the figure, the graph (x=fairness level; y=beta-values; blue bars=MS; green bars=TP; yellow bars=FW; 
error bars=SEM) shows the activation in MPFC [14 52 40]: there is a difference in b-values between the 
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h_dis and h_adv in UG_MS, but not in UG_TP. In FW, despite the same trend, this activation did not 
reach significance. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
In this study, I employed a modified version of the UG task, which allowed manipulating 
offers both for fairness and for advantageousness levels. The MS-TP distinction shows that the 
activation of left posterior superior and middle temporal gyri (BA 22) is higher in MS as opposed 
to TP. It is known from the literature that the both STG and MTG are involved in many kind of 
tasks, especially as far as semantic processing is concerned (Friederici, Opitz, and von Cramon, 
2000; Luo et al., 2003); however, these areas play an important role in other processes, such as 
detecting biological motion (Adolphs, 2003), explaining and predicting the behavior of others 
during theory of mind scenarios, and also deciding about complex ethical dilemmas (Fletcher et 
al., 1995; Heekeren et al., 2003; Paulus, Feinstein, Leland, and Simmons, 2005). In the case of 
this study, the recruitment of this area in MS could reflect the fact that participants think about 
the other person’s (A) situation, comparing it to his or her own situation. In TP, no comparison is 
going on because, probably, participants decide on the offers without putting themselves in the 
shoes of the third parties. The fact that, nevertheless, they reject unequal splits, suggests that the 
rejection of inequality should not be thought as an empathic response, but more as a heuristic 
that might be used by our cognitive system to face this kind of situation, when we have no other 
cues to drive decisions.  
As far as our initial hypotheses are concerned, the results show a different activation of 
anterior insula (AI) on one side and of the ACC, extending to a more anterior part of the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) on the other side. In particular, AI showed a major activation for 
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extremely (and mid) unfair offers as opposed to fair offers, irrespectively of the target of the 
offers, whereas ACC and MPFC are active when facing unfair offers for myself, but not on 
behalf of third party; in particular, the anterior part of MPFC is more active when 
disadvantageous divisions are considered. These results appear to support our initial hypothesis, 
which claim the involvement of AI and MPFC in two different cognitive processes. 
 
5.5.1 Self-Specific Neural Networks 
A review of the literature about the functions of the different parts of the medial prefrontal 
cortex can be found in the discussion section in chapter 3; this area is accounted for self-other 
judgments, as well as for moral judgments, and, more broadly, for heterogeneous functions, 
which involve the co-occurrence of cognitive, emotional and social processes. As already 
reported, overlaps between these different cognitive processes have often been suggested 
(Jenkins et al., 2008, Hynes et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006), also in 
cause of the fact that some of these processes are confounded one another such as self-referential 
and emotional processing (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In the study described in chapter 3, I have 
reported an activation of the middle-anterior portion (y ≈ 58, z ≈ 8) of the MPFC (Figure 3.4b, 
green cluster) which, in contrast to the more ventral part involved mainly in self-perception, may 
reflect a recruitment of this area when facing self-directed unfair behavior, correlating this 
activation with emotional arousal evoked by a self-affecting unfair offer. As previously pointed 
out, the model of MPFC activation proposed by Amodio and Frith (2006) suggests that value-
related representations extend the more anterior, the more complex they become, integrating with 
socio-affective processes. In accordance with this idea, in the current study, different portions of 
the MPFC were involved in different processes. In particular, two clusters within the medial 
110 
 
prefrontal cortex are differentially activated. On the one hand, the ACC activation (y≈ 18) 
reflected the degree of unfairness of the offers: the more the offer was unfair, the more the area 
was active, irrespectively of the advantageousness of the offer. This U-shape activation was 
significant in UG_MS specifically; it showed the same trend also in UG_TP, nevertheless 
without reaching significance. It is known from the literature that cognitive demand requires the 
involvement of ACC (Pardo, Janer, and Raichle, 1990; van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, and 
Carter, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, and Carter, 2004), and these data go in this direction: the ACC is 
more active when the unfairness is higher, namely when the decision is harder and requires more 
cognitive effort, elicited by the contrasting principles that vie for the response. The fact that the 
activation is significantly high in MS but not in TP, despite showing the same trend in the latter, 
is plausible considering that taking a decision that affect the personal payoff is more effortful as 
compared to taking a decision that affects others.   
On the other hand, a more anterior part of the medial prefrontal gyrus (y≈ 52, z≈40) was 
involved specifically in the perception of unfair disadvantageous offers; again, no significant 
effect for the UG_TP was showed. In line with predictions of Amodio and Frith’s model, 
whereas the more posterior part of the MPFC was implicated in actions and conflict monitoring, 
the more anterior part is associated with meta-cognitive representations and integrates the values 
of the possible outcomes with socio-affective motives: in this case, the higher activation related 
to disadvantageous offers, as opposed to fair, is likely to reflect the negative affective reaction to 
unfairness when it is specifically affecting the self. This result is in line with our previous study, 
in which the anterior part of the MPFC (y<4mm) was recruited when reacting to self-directed 
unfairness. 
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5.5.2 Fairness-Specific Neural Networks 
As far as the fairness, or equality, as it should be called in this case, perception is 
concerned, the hypotheses have been supported by the data. The activation of the cluster 
involving anterior insula, with an extension to the inferior frontal gyrus, bilaterally, was higher 
when processing unequal offers, as opposed to equal ones, irrespectively of the target. This 
activation could be interpreted as an involvement of the AI in processing general unfairness, 
rather than being correlated to the negative emotions elicited by the self-affecting unfairness, as 
proposed by Sanfey et al. (2003). In chapter 3, the results described AI as involved in reaction to 
the perceived unfairness; however, first of all it was not possible to disentangle the reaction to 
unfairness perceived as a general violation of a social norm from reaction to unfairness perceived 
as a damage both for the self and for a third-party, who was likely to be considered as a group 
member. Secondly, it was not possible to understand whether the activation of the AI was to be 
related either to the perception of the inequality of the outcome or to the perception of the 
unfairness of proposer's behavior. In this study, both issues have been addressed, diminishing the 
degree of identification with the third party and, most importantly, ruling out the perception of 
unfairness in relation to the behavior, focusing only on the inequality of the outcome. The results 
suggest that AI’s activation reflects the inequality of the outcome rather that the violation of a 
socially accepted behavior, therefore, it is possible that the AI signals a deviation from the 
expected outcome, which, in this case, is to be considered the equal division. This interpretation 
is in line with Güroğlu et al. (2008), who found a higher AI’s activation when participants (i.e. 
responders in the UG) engaged themselves in behaviors which deviated from the expected ones, 
such as accepting unfair offers or rejecting unfair offers when the unfairness was unintended; the 
authors hypothesized that AI correlates with the detection of norm violations, which are context-
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dependent. My interpretation, in lights of the findings I have presented so far, is that AI's 
involvement in detecting violations is not limited to behavioral violations (i.e. unfair treatment), 
but extends also to the outcomes; in this case, the outcome was decided by chance, and still AI 
was active for unequal divisions.  
However, despite this evidence, it is not clear whether the AI signals the deviation from 
equality considered as the desired outcome (moral principle), or as the expected outcome 
(normative rule). Further work is needed in order to clarify this issue, such as disentangle the 
unequal division from the perception of the normative, and expected, outcome. 
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Chapter 6 
General discussion 
 
 
Over recent years, plenty of evidence has suggested a link between  emotions and 
people’s judgments about the wrongness of certain behaviors, such as those which cause harm to 
other people (Haidt, 2003; Shaun, 2004; Moll et al., 2008), thus leading to the idea that these two 
aspects  might be causally related, i.e. emotions, specially negative emotions, drive people to 
refuse the wrongness of behaviors (Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007)5. This account has 
been extended from the moral thinking to the field of economics; given that experimental data 
challenged the model of homo economicus, in that generally people tend to behave against their 
self-interest when facing fairness norms’ violations (e.g. for the case of UG, see Guth et al., 
1982), it has been hypothesized that the cause of the rejection of these violations had to be found 
in the emotional reactions (Pillutla and Mournighan, 1996). Neuroscientific evidence supporting 
                                              
5  This account is an extension of the somatic-marker hypothesis, originally formulated by Damasio et al. 
(1991), which proposes that emotional mechanisms can guide our behavior when facing complex and conflicting 
choices that  cause our cognitive (as opposed to emotional) system to be overloaded and not sufficient anymore.  
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this account has been brought forward by Sanfey et al. (2003), who identified in the activation of 
the anterior insula the proof of an emotional involvement in fairness judgments, by van’t Wout et 
al. (2006), who correlated the increase in the skin conductance response to the rejections of 
unfair splits, and by Koenigs et al. (2007), who found that patients with a ventromedial prefrontal 
damage, known for entailing deficits in emotional control, rejects more unfair offers as opposed 
to controls, just to cite three among the several studies on the topic.  
 In its traditional formulation, the UG, however is a self-centered task, and does not allow 
to disentangling between the perception of pure unfairness from the perception of self-affecting 
unfairness; it follows that it is not clear whether emotions have to be related to one aspect or the 
other of the task. At the beginning of this chapter (6.1) I will address this issue in lights of the 
results I have obtained in my studies. 
Emotions have been linked to the rejection of unfairness, but what do people exactly 
reject, when rejecting an unfair division? Many accounts have been proposed to answer to this 
question. Rabin (1993) argued that people want to punish unfair behavior, considered a violation 
of the fairness norm, and for this reason they reject, even though this means to give up a certain 
gain. The negative reciprocity account has been supported by much evidence that described 
intentionality as necessary for the perception of unfairness and, consequently, for rejections (e.g., 
Blount, 1995, Güroğlu et al., 2008). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proposed that people are more 
concerned about the inequality of the payoffs and, therefore, they are interested in keeping the 
payoff as equal as possible, by rejecting unfair divisions. In its formulation, however, the theory 
predicts a preference for self-centered inequality, which means that people are actually concerned 
about unequal splits, but they are much more prone to accept them when advantageous for 
themselves. All these accounts have been put forward in order to explain responders’ behavior in 
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the UG. However, the preferences expressed by people playing the traditional UG do not allow 
to clearly supporting one of these theories. In fact, first of all in the UG there is always an 
involved proposer, so it is not clear whether people would reject even if this would not mean to 
punish the source of unfairness. Secondly, in the traditional UG as it is, it is not possible, in cause 
of the low plausibility, to administering participants with unfair but advantageous offers, making 
impossible to verify Fehr and Schmidt’s prediction of a preference for self-centered inequality. 
These issues will be addresses, in lights of the results obtained, in paragraph 6.2. 
 
6.1 Emotional involvement and self-concerns 
It has been widely discussed how responders in the UG are frustrated by the unfairness, 
and, as a cause of this, they irrationally reject unfair offers: the most established view is that the 
perception of unfairness, intended as a norm violation, elicits a negative emotional reaction. I 
have challenged whether this assumption holds even when unfairness is not self-affecting. To do 
so, I have developed a modified version of the UG in which participants were required to accept 
or reject offers either for themselves (myself condition) or on behalf of an unknown third party 
(third party condition). In this paradigm, responders had to decide both on unfair divisions that 
were affecting their own payoff (self-affecting unfairness) and on unfair splits that had absolutely 
no consequences for their payoff (pure unfairness). Whereas no difference in the rejection rate 
was found between myself and third party, both psychophysiological and imaging results suggest 
that signs of emotional involvement were actually correlated with unfairness, but only when this 
was affecting the self.  
How can neuroscientific findings help to understand this decisional process? The fact that 
behavioral data does not show any difference between the two targets, while psychophysiological 
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and imaging data do, indicates that there is not a direct correlation between emotions and 
rejections. Even if it is not possible to claim that no emotion is involved in the third party 
condition, it is reasonable to argue that different mechanisms are involved in the two tasks; one 
mechanism, that involve the activation of the anterior MPFC, is recruited when reacting to self-
directed unfairness, a condition which also elicit high emotional arousal, while the other 
mechanism, involving the AI, is recruited when reacting to pure unfairness, that is irrespectively 
of the target of the unfairness. As far as the MPFC is concerned, tits selective activation when 
participants react to self-directed unfairness is in line with Amodio and Frith’s model (2006), 
which claims that value-related representations in the ventral MPFC extend the more anterior 
(and superior), the more complex they become, and that they integrate with socio-affective 
processes. This model applies both to the results of chapter 3 and of chapter 5, where is shown 
that a further anterior area of the MPFC is more sensitive to unfairness when is disadvantageous 
for the subject.  
The results suggest that there is something peculiar about the self-involvement in the 
perception of unfairness; the interpretations proposed so far in the literature, however, have 
generalized these peculiarities to a broader interpretation of the perception of norms’ violations, 
by claiming that the rejection of norms’ violations implies a negative emotional reaction which 
lead to irrational behaviors, such as in the UG case. In contrast, I argue that the emotional 
involvement is a side effect, which depends upon self-involvement. Thus, negative emotions are 
not the best candidate to explain exhaustively the aversion towards fairness violations; what 
about the other candidates, which are negative reciprocity and inequality aversion? 
 
6.2 Negative reciprocity, inequality aversion and self-involvement as salient contextual cue. 
117 
 
As discussed above, and extensively in chapter 4, the “involved proposer” is a limitation 
of the traditional UG, if we are interested in testing both the negative reciprocity and the 
inequality aversion account. The former has been tested by a number of studies, which found that 
manipulating the intentions of the proposer influenced the rate of rejections of responders 
(Blount, 1995; Güroğlu et al., 2008). However,, in most of these studies, participants’ attention 
was focused on the intentions, leading them to take this variable into consideration (see chapter 
4). Moreover, in some studies (e.g., Blount, 1995, Sanfey et al., 2003, in van’t Wout et al., 2006), 
when participants are required to decide upon offers made by a computer, they reject less, as 
compared to the condition in which the opponent is a human being, but they do not reject zero, as 
it would be expected if rejections are delivered as a punishment for proposer’s unfair behavior. 
The effects produced by the manipulations of the UG described in chapter 4 suggest that the will 
to punish an unfair proposer is not necessarily the only motive which drives rejections. As for the 
emotional involvement, I am not claiming that negative reciprocity does not contribute to the 
observed behavior but that this does not explain the data I presented here, given that participants 
rejected unequal division also when the allocation was decided by an external uninvolved 
proposer, or even by a computer algorithm.  
In light of these results, it is evident that people reject the inequality of the outcome, even 
excluding the intended unfairness of the proposer. The second manipulation that I have 
introduced, made possible by the non-involvement of the proposer, focuses on the perception of 
inequality in relation to the self. The hypothesis, following Fehr and Schmidt’s account, is that 
responders are much more willing to accept unfairness when it is self-advantageous, and, in fact, 
it is exactly what happened: responders rejected inequality that was disadvantageous but 
accepted advantageous unequal splits. Interestingly, when asked to decide on behalf of 
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completely unrelated third parties, and when they had no reason to favor one person over the 
other, participants rejected unequal splits. Imaging data, discussed in chapter 5, corroborate the 
idea of different mechanisms involved in equality perception, whether it is self- or other- 
directed, and converge with the data discussed in chapter 3. On the one hand, MPFC is recruited 
specifically when the self is involved, in particular when the self is exposed to unfairness; 
moreover, an anterior part of the MPFC is more sensitive to disadvantageous unfairness as 
opposed to advantageous, suggesting the higher, probably emotional, salience of this condition. 
The activation in AI, on the other hand, is modulated by the degree of inequality, no matter 
whether it is self- or other- directed, or advantageous or disadvantageous for the responder.  
There are accounts which suggest that our choices, and, consequently, our preferences 
regarding, for instance, monetary utility, vary with our sensitivity to the contingent contextual 
cues (Bicchieri, 2006). For this reason, we might decide to accept an unfair offer when we know 
that the proposer has no other choice, and reject it otherwise; similarly, we might accept an unfair 
offer, or even an unequal split, when we know that our opponent earned the right to be, to a 
certain extent, the winner (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Taken together, the results presented here 
suggest that the self-involvement has to be considered one of these –very basic- salient 
contextual cues; in fact, when ruling it out, such as I did in the third party condition, people show 
a clean, perfect, U-shaped inequality aversion effect, suggesting that the self-involvement is 
affecting one side of the curve, pushing rejections towards the zero when offers were 
advantageous. The AI activation suggests also that a basic mechanism exists to signal this norm’s 
deviation, and that an additional recruitment of the MPFC is needed when the salient cue is 
added. In the next paragraphs I will discuss these issues more in details. 
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6.3 Inequality aversion as a default mode: moral norm or social heuristic? 
A quite heated cross-discipline debate on the role played by moral and social norms on 
behavior is interesting many researchers in different fields, such as economics, psychology, 
philosophy; Cristina Bicchieri, in her book Grammar of Society (2006), developed an account in 
which she has described people’s behavior as guided by their knowledge of norms, and these 
norms get triggered depending on which cues are salient in a context. So, for instance, if the 
proposer has earned the right to be the proposer, this might not trigger the same norm that gets 
triggered in the standard UG, in which behavior is guided by non-better specified norms of 
fairness. More generally, how people behave in economic games, as in life, depends on which 
norms get triggered, and this depends on how people interpret the situation.  
Here I suggest that the phenomenon of the inequality aversion has to be considered as a 
default mode; if there are no particular motives to prefer one person over the other, the unfair or 
unequal division is mostly rejected, even when rejections are not intended to signal a violation. 
This default mode is perturbed by salient environmental cues that shift the preferences towards 
one extreme or the other. These cues can be self-involvement, as we have seen so far, merit, or 
information that we have about our opponent (Camerer & Thaler, 1995); if we know that the 
proposer is a person in need, we might be a bit more tolerant towards unfair divisions, accepting 
more. As far as the original interpretation of inequality aversion, by Fehr and Schmidt, is 
concerned, I would propose, instead, to change the name to the definition; if a person rejects 
inequality only when it is self-disadvantageous, but accept it when self-advantageous, I would 
talk about competitiveness rather than inequality aversion.  
Coming back to Bicchieri’s account, another crucial distinction is the one between 
personal and social norms: according to the author, if the desire to conform to a norm is 
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conditional to our expectations on others following the same norm, then that norm is social. On 
the contrary, personal norms, which include moral norms and habits, such as, in Bicchieri’s 
example, brushing one’s teeth at night, do not depend on my expectations on others’ behavior. 
The hypothesis is that equal-division norm, and, in general, fairness norms which are followed in 
the UG, are social norms; If we put people in the UG and we manipulate their expectations about 
whether others would divide equally, this should affect the offers that proposers make. In a recent 
set of studies, this is exactly what happened. Bicchieri and Xiao (2008) had participants play the 
Dictator game; before the participants played the game, they were set up with different 
expectations. One group was told: ‘60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year approximately maximized their own earnings (i.e., their counterpart got 
20% or less).’ Another group was told: ‘60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this 
experiment last year shared the amount approximately equally (i.e., their counterpart got 40% or 
more).’ What the authors found was that among participants who expected others to divide 
unequally only 33% conformed to the equal-division norm, whereas 52% of those who expected 
others to divide equally conformed to the equal-division norm. However, as discussed by Nichols 
(forthcoming), this evidence does not necessarily refute the idea that equal-division is a personal 
norm, if, free from expectations’ biases, we desire to divide equally; nevertheless, as the authors 
claim, the desire to divide equally is not my only desire, given that, for instance, I also want to 
make money. As I have discussed in chapter 4, there are three principles that might drive 
behavior in UG: maximization of the payoff (rationality), competitiveness (self-oriented fairness) 
and pure fairness preference. Environmental cues might drive the choice: when the responder is 
personally involved in the bargain, the three principles vie to the response; when she is not 
personally involved, rationality principle and fairness are competing for the response. In light of 
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the previous considerations, not only environmental cues, but also personality traits are likely to 
be involved in the decisions; it might be the case that equal division is a personal norm for many 
people, but for many other people, equal division is, instead, a social norm.  It is known from the 
literature that individual differences in performance in economic games can be explained by 
identifying people as prosocial, when they are more likely to seek equality in outcomes in 
economic games, individualists, when they care only about their self-interest, and competitive, 
when the interest is the maximization of the difference in the outcomes (Van Lange, 1999; 
Haruno & Frith, 2010).  For this, I suggest here that accounts which consider the integration of 
all these aspects, i.e. default mode choices, personality traits and expectations, are the best 
candidates to explain behavior in economic games (Rustichini, 2009).  
  
6.4 The role of the anterior insula 
 As I have discussed extensively in chapter 3, the AI plays a role in many different tasks 
involving different cognitive and emotional demands. A very detailed review has been published 
by Craig in 2009. AI is involved in interoception, pain perception and empathy, self-recognition, 
vocalization and music, emotional awareness, time perception, perceptual decision making, 
cognitive control and performance monitoring, etc. The author proposed an account that 
integrates all these findings by interpreting AI as involved in awareness, defined as “knowing 
that one exists”. In many studies reviewed, the findings might be interpreted as AI’s activation 
reflects deviation from the expected outcome, even though the expectation is not explicit. Just to 
cite a few examples, as far as cognitive control is concerned, AI’s activation is higher when 
perceiving the stop-signal (a signal that should trigger the inhibition of the response which was, 
in turn, previously triggered by the target); moreover, the activation increased together with the 
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rarity of the stop-signal (Brass, & Haggard, 2007; Ramautar, Slagter, Kok, and Ridderinkhof, 
2006). As far as music perception is involved, Platel et al. (1997), using PET, found 
differentiated brain regions associated with familiarity, pitch, rhythm and timbre in music 
listening and in particular a robust activation in the left AIC during the rhythm task, in which 
occasional notes in well-known melodies were mistimed. Under this perspective, the self-
awareness hypothesis can be interpreted as the integration of external stimuli with the complex 
set of motivations and expectations of the subject.  
 Here, I proposed that AI might signal either a deviation from fairness or, more in general, 
a deviation from an expected outcome. Following the arguments on norms presented above, AI 
could either signal the deviation from a desired outcome, if fairness is actually considered as the 
desired outcome (personal norm), or a deviation from the expected outcome (social norm). In 
order to disentangle between these two options, further work is needed: it is necessary to test 
AI’s activation when modifying people’s expectation in the UG task I have used in the 
experiment described in chapter 5, by shifting it towards a more or less equal outcome. If the 
AI’s activation varies together with the shift of expectation, then it is likely AI reflects the social 
aspect of the equal-division norm; otherwise it could reflect the personal aspect. However, in any 
case, personality traits should not be neglected, and must be considered when evaluating 
expectations.  
 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
Are human beings actually endowed with the desire to be altruistic and the will to divide 
resources equally, or do the altruistic behaviors that are performed depend on their will to 
conform to social norms, because they fear punishment or sanctions? The debate on whether 
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fairness should be considered as a moral or a social norm is vivid and of much interest. The 
importance of finding an answer to this question lies in the possibility to manipulate human 
cognitive and emotional reactions to certain events in order to increase behaviors such as, for 
instance, charity giving. How can neuroscience enter this debate? Neuroscientific data may be 
used to integrate, or to clarify, behavioral evidence, to help disentangling between different 
hypothesis, as in the case of the role played by AI.  
On the other hand, how can the investigation of these topics help to understand of brain 
structures and functioning? Integrating the evidence from different studies, from those that use 
very basic tasks, such as perceptual decision making, to those that use more complex tasks, such 
as economic games, contributes to unfold the complexity of the functioning of brain areas, like in 
the case of AI. There is a lot of skepticism around this possible integration, both from hardcore 
economists and hardcore neuroscientists, as it is natural when new approaches start to question 
old and consolidate theories. However, the human being as we know it derives from a complex 
integration of functions, and it is this special integration that makes him/her unique. It is not 
possible to fully understand one aspect (e.g., economic choices) without taking in consideration 
another fundamental one (e.g., brain organization). Thus, the take-home message I would like to 
leave is that, assuming that the data are carefully interpret, and fast and easy enthusiasms are 
avoided, the road to go down to is the one of integrations among disciplines; and the better the 
communication among different professionals (economists, neuroscientists, philosophers and so 
on), the more reliable the results will be. 
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